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Summary 
 
The unifying theme of this thesis is the past, present and future household and family 
structure in various Nordic countries. It provides a forecast of household structure in Denmark 
and Finland. An application of household forecasts is to study the implications for energy use 
– a topical issue in an environmental context. Here the effect of divorce is considered. 
Another strand of the research on household structure is to examine potential links between 
selected aspects of family structure and mortality.  This thesis studies two such aspects. 
 
A finding from the detailed probabilistic household forecast is that the proportion of 
households that are one-person households is likely to increase during the coming decades as 
it has done in the past decades, leading most probably to a further decline in the average 
household size. On the other hand, the share of households consisting of married couples is 
likely to fall.  Part of the explanation is high divorce and union dissolution rates. Splitting one 
household into two leads to higher domestic energy use as a result of loss of economies of 
scale. However, taking into account the depressing effect of divorce on fertility, higher 
divorce rates may not entail mounting total domestic energy use in the long term; indeed, it 
may even lead to lower household energy consumption. The results presented here show that 
in the short run higher dissolution rates lead to higher domestic energy consumption, but in 
the long run it might drive down energy use due to low fertility. 
 
The thesis also addresses the possible link between mortality and two aspects of the family 
structure, namely the gender composition of one’s children and whether or not one is a 
grandparent. Neither has so far received much attention. I find only limited support for the 
hypothesis that having children of only one sex is associated with a mortality disadvantage -  
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for mothers with two or more children. The link between grandparenthood and mortality is 
stronger, with grandfathers in general experiencing higher mortality than fathers who are not 
grandfathers. The association varies with characteristics of the grandparents, especially age, 
with young grandmothers also displaying a mortality disadvantage, and those who became 
grandmothers after age 50 having a mortality advantage.  
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Introduction 
 
Family and living arrangements are of vital importance for both the individual and society1. 
On the individual level it has an impact on health, mortality and well-being. For public 
administration household development is crucial for planning housing and use of domestic 
energy; and public revenue as well as expenditure is affected by family structure.  
Many of these factors can work both ways. Health can be influenced by the type of household 
you live in but can also have implications for the type of household you live in. For example 
marriage might have a protective effect through discouraging unhealthy behaviour such as 
excessive consumption of alcohol, by providing companionship and through household 
economies of scale. On the other hand good health can make you more attractive as a partner 
and poor health might lead you to move to an institution or move in with relatives. Household 
structure can influence public finances, for example the level of child support might depend 
on whether you are a single parent, but tax and social security rules and public policy can also 
provide economic incentives to choose a certain type of living arrangement or family. For 
example generous spending on parental leave and child care might encourage people to have 
children2 and if pension rules depend on marital status it can have an impact on marriage 
decisions (Baker et al. 2004; Brien et al. 2004). 
All the studies in this thesis focus on how demographic transition probabilities are linked to 
household and family in one or more of the Nordic countries. Paper I considers the future 
Danish and Finnish household structure. Using household register data, we are able to show in 
                                                          
1 A family is defined as a set of persons who are related either through marriage, birth or adoption, whereas a 
household can be defined either as those who live together (household-dwelling definition) or as those who live 
together and share a household budget (housekeeping definition). 
2 See next section for details 
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more detail than earlier studies, how the fertility, mortality and union dissolution probabilities 
depend on current household status (not only marital status) and use these probabilities to 
determine tomorrow’s household structure. In addition the uncertainties are quantified. Paper 
II addresses how the lower fertility outcomes among the divorced can mitigate the negative 
environmental effect of higher domestic energy use caused by splitting one household into 
two following a divorce. This paper employs Danish register data.  
Decades of research have shown that mortality is associated with the family you are a part of.  
Not only is mortality lower among those who are currently married compared to the never 
married and previously married (e.g. Manzoli et al. 2007; Koskinen et al. 2007; Waite and 
Lehrer 2003), but parents have lower mortality than the childless (at least at low parities) -  an 
effect which is influenced by the spacing of the children (Grundy and Tomassini 2005) as 
well as whether the children have higher education (Zimmer et al. 2007; Friedman and Mare 
2010; Torssander 2013). Paper III and IV build on this tradition by considering, respectively, 
whether the gender of one’s children and whether or not one is a grandparent has an impact on 
mortality. In both these papers Norwegian register data are utilised.  
The rest of this introduction is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of 
the Nordic demographic household and family pattern and compares it to the rest of Europe. 
The last section is the paper, “Household and Family development in the Nordic countries” 
which gives an historical overview of the past 50 years focusing on the last 30. I then give a 
summary of each of the papers included in this thesis.  
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Nordic demographic household and family pattern in a European 
perspective 
 
Kuijsten (1995) argues that the Nordic countries have the longest tradition for considering 
demographic behaviour to be totally private. Whether to cohabit or marry; or have a child 
before or after marrying, is seen to be entirely up to the individual or couple. Indeed, the 
Nordic countries were forerunners when it comes to trends such as the rise in unmarried 
cohabitation, the decline in and postponement of marriage as well as the higher proportion of 
births taking place out of wedlock. Although many of these demographic trends are now 
witnessed all over Europe, there are still large cross-national differences. This overview aims 
to place the Nordic demographic pattern in a European context and to discuss the 
determinants of the differences we observe3.  
Leaving the parental home is for most young people the first demographic event on the way to 
adulthood, and Nordic youth on average do so earlier than the majority of their counterparts in 
the rest of Europe (Aassve et al. 2002; Billari et al. 2001; Billari and Wilson 2001; Iacovou  
2001;  Iacovou and Berthoud 2001;  Vogel 2002; Billari 2004; Mandic 2008). In the 1970-
1979 cohorts the median age at leaving the parental home was below 20 in all the Nordic 
countries (Billari and Liefbroer 2010). This is around a year earlier than in most Western 
European countries, a few years earlier than in Eastern Europe and well below the median age 
in Southern Europe (Spain 27 years and Italy 28 years in the 1970-1979 cohorts). Furthermore, 
very few have not left the parental home by the time they turn 30 (Billari et al. 2001).  
Buchmann and Kriesi (2011) argue that this is the result of relatively weak family ties, a 
welfare state geared towards the individual as well as a strong belief in young people’s 
                                                          
3 I will in the following focus on demographic features that are common to all or most of the Nordic countries and to a large 
extent disregard variation within the Nordic region.   
12 
 
autonomy. Nordic parents also put great emphasis on their children’s independence (Chiuri 
and Del Boca 2008).  Furthermore, the Nordic welfare states spend a greater proportion of 
their expenditure on young adults than the majority of other European countries and offer 
generous student loans (Chiuri and Del Boca 2008; Sobotka and Toulemon 2008).  Levels of 
youth unemployment and job insecurity are other important factors in explaining cross 
country variations, as are differences in access to mortgage markets (Becker et al. 2010; 
Martins and Villanueva 2009).  
In addition to being more likely than other Europeans to move out of the parental home before 
entering their first union, Nordic young adults also enter their first union at the youngest 
median age in Western Europe - below 22 for Nordic women in the 1970-1979 cohort (Billari 
and Wilson 2001; Billari and Liefbroer 2010; Buchmann and Kriesi 2011). The first union is 
much more likely to be a cohabiting union than a marriage (Billari and Wilson 2001; Billari 
and Liefbroer 2010;  Iacovou and Skew 2011) – around 90% of Nordic women born in the 
1970s cohabited before tying the knot – and the median duration of premarital cohabitation is 
longer than in other countries (Kasearu and Kutsar 2011).   
The proportion of unions that are cohabiting unions remains high in the Nordic countries into 
the thirties, especially among those who do not have children (Iacovou and Skew 2010). This 
is partly the result of having some of the highest average ages at first marriage for both men 
and women in Europe (Billari and Wilson 2001). For the 1970-1979 cohorts the Nordic 
countries, together with UK, France and Ireland, were those countries in Europe where 
median age for women at first marriage exceeded 30 (Billari and Liefbroer 2010). Kalmijin 
(2007) inquired into possible reasons for these cross-national differences. He found that the 
level of women’s employment is negatively correlated with marriage rates and positively 
correlated with levels of cohabitation. Cohabiting is also more common in more highly 
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educated populations, and Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity inhibit cohabitation. 
Furthermore, the Nordic countries have the highest levels of social approval of cohabitation 
(Noack et al. 2013), and whereas cohabitation can be viewed negatively in countries where it 
is rare, in countries where it is common, to marry without going through a trial period of 
cohabitation is viewed as deviant behaviour (Bernhardt 2001).  
Together with the UK and Ireland, the Nordic countries have the highest level of first births 
outside marriage in Western Europe (Billari and Wilson 2001). Of women born in the 1970s 
more than half of Nordic women had their first birth outside marriage (Billari and Liefbroer 
2010).  The majority of these were cohabiting.  
The median age at first birth in the Nordic countries is high, nearing 30 for women, but it is 
even higher in the Netherlands, Germany and the Mediterranean countries (Billari and 
Liefbroer 2010). The driving forces behind the fertility postponement are likely to be common 
across countries such as an increased wish for autonomy and freedom; and not least the 
increase in the number of women taking higher education and aiming for higher degrees than 
earlier generations, and increased female labour market participation (Ní Bhrolcháin and 
Beaujouan 2012; Mills et al. 2011; Neels and De Wachter 2010; Gustafsson et al. 2002). 
However, the fact that we witness a stronger postponement in Southern Europe than in the 
Nordic countries is likely due to higher economic insecurity such as higher youth 
unemployment in the South, which means that people delay taking decisions with long term 
economic implications - such as having children (Adsera 2011a; Mills et al. 2011; Adsera 
2005; De la Rica and Iza 2005; Mills et al.  2005, Kohler et al. 2002). 
Even though the average age at first birth is high, the Nordic countries have, together with 
France and the UK, the highest total fertility rates in Europe. The policies put in place to 
achieve a high degree of gender equality in the labour markets and to make it easier for 
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women to combine having a career with having a family, probably have a positive impact on 
fertility. Hoem (2005 p. 569) calls it being “child-friendly by being woman-friendly”. The 
employment rate among mothers is generally very high in the Nordic countries, and whereas 
it in other countries tends to decline steeply with the number of children a woman has, this is 
not the case in the Nordic countries4.  This has been achieved through an extensive provision 
of subsidised child care and long and generously paid parental leaves (Cosmin 2012; Haan 
and Wrohlich 2011; Luci and Thévenon 2011; Adsera 2004; Castles 2003). Hoem (2008 p. 
251) states that these policies “are pronatalist in effect, but not in stated intention”  
 In addition, the labour markets in the Nordic countries are more flexible with respect to 
working part time than in many other countries, and the higher education system is flexible 
when it comes to taking time out to have a child. These circumstances plus the relatively 
generous amount of money given to students who have a child mean that childbearing is 
higher among Nordic students than among students elsewhere in Europe (Kalwij 2010; 
Adsera 2004; Castles 2003). There is also a higher proportion of public sector jobs than in 
many other European countries. This has been linked to high fertility (Martín-García and 
Castro-Martín 2013; Solera and Bettio 2013; Adsera 2004; 2005; 2011a) as has a high level of 
job security (Adsera 2004; 2011a; 2011b) which is another trait of the Nordic job markets.  
The fact that extensive  public provision of formal childcare reduces the opportunity cost of 
childbearing, which is higher for women with higher education, and the fact that the economic 
returns to education are lower in the Nordic countries than in other European countries, 
especially for women (OECD 2008), might explain the small differences in fertility by 
educational attainment in comparison to countries such as the UK, Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland (Sobotka 2012; Andersson et al. 2009; Ratcliffe and Smith 2006; Spielauer 2004). 
                                                          
4 UNECE Statistical Database http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/database/STAT/30-GE/03-WorkAndeconomy/?lang=1 
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Particularly the level of childlessness among the highly educated is much lower in the Nordic 
countries than in countries such as Austria and Greece (Bagavos 2010; Neyer and Hoem 
2008).  
Studies considering the effect of a single policy aspect on fertility have often found very small 
effects (Balbo et al. 2013; Gauthier 2007; Kohler et al. 2006, Sleebos 2003; Gauthier and 
Hatzius 1997). However, taken together, the public policies and aspects of the Nordic labour 
markets summarised here constitute a family friendly society. As Hoem (2008 p. 255) puts it 
“each element may have only an incremental influence, together they may add up to 
something other than the constituent parts”.  
Divorce rates are higher in the Nordic countries than in the majority of other European 
countries. Compared to its Western European counterparts divorce rates in the Nordic 
countries, which were among the first countries to introduce no-fault divorce laws, were high 
already in the 1950s and 1960s (Smith 2002). This study mentions two factors that might 
explain variations in divorce rates across countries - religion and women’s economic status. 
Catholicism has had a more strictly negative attitude against and been more vocal in its 
condemnation of divorce than the Protestant churches in Europe, especially the Lutheran state 
churches in the Nordic countries.  Women’s high levels of employment in the Nordic 
countries can also have led to high divorce rates as it has given them financial independence 
making it easier for them to initiate a divorce and lowered the gains from marriage (Becker et 
al. 1977). Both these theories were confirmed in a cross national study which found that 
women’s employment levels were positively associated with divorce and that levels of 
religiousness were negatively associated with divorce (Kalmijn 2007). The study also finds 
that divorce is more prevalent in more highly educated populations, which might be due to 
more individualistic behaviour in such populations.   
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As a result of the high divorce rates and high levels of childbearing within cohabiting unions, 
which are less stable than married unions, the Nordic countries have, together with the Baltic 
countries, UK and Ireland, some of the highest proportions of single parents in Europe 
(Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Iacovou and Skew 2010; 2011). Parents are also more likely to 
be cohabiting than anywhere else in Europe (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008).  
Since fertility is relatively high and childlessness is uncommon, it is not surprising that the 
percentage of those aged 50 and over who are grandparents is higher in the Nordic countries 
than in the majority of other European countries (Glaser et al. 2010). Grandparents in the 
Nordic countries are more likely to provide some form of childcare for their grandchildren 
than grandparents in the rest of Europe, especially those in Sothern Europe. However, they are 
the least likely to provide regular childcare (Hank and Buber 2009; Koslowski 2009). 
Albertini et al. (2007) argue that the reason why more Nordic grandparents than Southern 
European grandparents offer some child care is that Mediterranean elderly are unlikely to help 
with childcare if they don’t co-reside with their grandchildren. The high female employment 
in the Nordic countries might also mean that there is a higher need for occasional babysitting 
due to overtime work or work-related travel. The reasons why grandparents in the Nordic 
countries are less involved in caring for their grandchildren on a daily basis include the high 
coverage of formal childcare, generous parental leaves, high labour force participation also 
among women who are grandmothers, and relatively high retirement ages – in the Nordic 
countries a higher proportion of grandparents are in paid work than in the rest of Europe 
(Glaser et al. 2010).  In addition, there are very low levels of co-residence between 
grandparents and their grandchildren (Koslowski 2009), and adult children tend to live further 
away from their parents than in the rest of Europe (Hank 2007). 
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As extended family households are extremely rare a larger proportion of elderly people in the 
Nordic countries live alone or with only a spouse than in the majority of other European 
countries (Iacovou  2000a; Iacovou and Skew 2011; Tomassini et al. 2004).  In addition to a 
generally more individualistic culture than in Sothern Europe, there is a strong preference for 
independent living among Nordic elderly and less desire for contact with younger people 
(Tomassini et al. 2004).  Income is also an important factor in explaining cross-national 
differences in living arrangements among the elderly (Iacovou  2000b ; Gaymu et al. 2006) 
and helps explain why the Nordic countries with their generous pension systems have such 
high shares of people living alone. High levels of social spending also means more elderly 
people with limiting health problems live independently (Iacovou  2000b). Middle aged 
people in the Nordic countries are those who are most likely to say that their parents should 
move into a nursing home or receive professional help at home if their health deteriorates 
instead of receiving help from their children, and the proportion of elderly living in nursing 
homes are indeed higher than in the rest of Europe (Tomassini et al. 2004).  
The Nordic life expectancy is high, which is likely due to favourable socioeconomic 
conditions such as high GDP per capita, low levels of income inequality as well as highly 
developed welfare states and generous pension systems (Rodgers 1979: McIsaac and 
Wilkinson 1997; Wilkinson 1992; Duleep 1995: Lundberg et al. 2008; Esser and Palme 2010). 
However, life expectancy is lower than in the Mediterranean countries, especially for women. 
This is probably to a large part due to differences in diet and the protective effect the 
Mediterranean diet has on the risk of developing cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes and 
Alzheimer’s (e.g. Sofi et al. 2008; 2010; Martínez-González et al. 2008; Scarmeas et al. 2006; 
de Lorgeril et al. 2002; Trichopoulou et al. 2000). There is especially a marked difference in 
deaths from cardiovascular disease. For example death rates from ischemic heart disease in 
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the Nordic countries are more than double those of the Mediterranean countries (de Lorgeril 
et al. 2002).  
Life expectancy in Denmark as well as for Finnish men is low compared to the other Nordic 
countries. This is mainly due to higher mortality among the middle aged and is a result of 
higher alcohol consumption and a higher prevalence of smoking (Vollset 2013; Juel 2000; 
Juel et al. 2000; Juel 2008). One study has claimed that the latter characteristic, in Denmark, 
can be attributed to the smoking habits of Denmark’s popular queen Margrethe II (Kesteloot 
2001).  
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Abstract  
There have been major changes to the household and family structure in the Nordic 
countries during the past 50 years.  The number of households has increased much 
faster than the population, leading to a significant drop in average household size. The 
reasons are multifaceted including lower fertility, a rise in divorces, more cohabiting 
relationships - which are less stable than marriages and fewer elderly living with 
relatives. I will in this article look at the main developments in Nordic household and 
family structure during the last decades as well as expected future changes, consider 
different age groups and look at children’s living arrangements. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a wide variety of reasons why we are interested in studying the development 
of household and family structure. The Aging Households and the Nordic Welfare 
model (AGHON) project, which this article is part of, aims to examine the changes in 
the Nordic household structure and their economic consequences1, more specifically 
how changing household patterns affect public finances both on the income and 
expenditure side. An example is cash benefits to families which may in many cases be 
targeted to specific family types such as single parents. The level of support received 
may also depend on household status, with those living alone receiving more than 
those who benefit from the economies of scale larger households provide. Changes in 
household structure influence the housing demand and therefore affect housing prices 
which again affect public expenditure on housing benefits. For the elderly living 
arrangements affects the need for home care services, and demand for places in 
nursing homes as well as the frequency and length of hospital spells (e.g. Iwashyna and 
Christakis, 2003; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 1999; Lakdawalla et al., 2003; Prior and 
Hayes, 2003; Grundy and Jital, 2007). Fertility is influenced by changes in family 
structure such as divorce and determines public expenditure on child care and 
education. On the income side, tax payments sometimes depend on marital status, or 
there are tax deductions for example for single parents. Lone parents also often have a 
lower labour supply and therefore pay less income tax. 
In addition to these public finance implications changes in the household 
structure affects the demand for consumer durables, as well as electricity and car use 
(e.g. Prskawetz, Leiwen and O’Neill, 2004; O’Neill and Chen, 2002), and therefore 
plays an important role in determining the levels of 2CO emissions (e.g. MacKellar et 
al. 1995; Wier et al. 2001). At the individual level health and mortality are strongly 
correlated with living arrangements (e.g. Grundy, 2001; Lund et al., 2002; Joutsenniemi, 
2007; Koskinen et al., 2007 and Drefahl, 2012), as is well-being (e.g. Stack and 
Esheman, 1998; Soons and Liefbroer, 2008; Mastekaasa and Næss, 2011).   
 This article will shed light on some of the main developments in household 
and family structure in the Nordic countries during the last decades, and put the future 
expected changes in household structure in a historical context. I start of presenting 
the data and main developments. After a closer look at particular age groups, I turn to 
children’s living arrangements. The penultimate section presents some results from 
probabilistic household projections for Denmark and Finland. The final section 
concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For details see http://www.etla.fi/en/research-projects/aging-households-nordic-welfare-model-
aghon/ 
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2. Data 
The data I have used are from the Nordic national statistical offices. Denmark and 
Finland have household registers running back to the 1980s. Data preceding the 
registers are mainly from censuses. In Norway a household register was put in place 
using information collected in the 2001 Population and housing census. This means 
that yearly household statistics are available from 2005 onwards. Earlier data come 
from censuses as well as sample surveys. The latest Swedish census was held in 1990 
and after that household statistics have been compiled using sample surveys. In 2006 it 
was decided that a Swedish household register will be developed.  
 According to the UN2, a family is “those members of the household who are 
related [...] through blood, adoption or marriage”. A household can be defined in one 
of two ways. In the housekeeping definition a household is a group of people who “ pool 
their incomes and have a common budget to a greater or lesser extent; they may be 
related or unrelated persons or a combination of persons both related and unrelated.” 
In the alternative definition based on household-dwelling “a household consists of all 
persons living together in a housing unit.3”For example a group of students who live 
together but where each provides for himself would be one household according to 
the second definition but multiple households according to the first definition. In the 
household registers as well as censuses the household dwelling definition is employed. 
Since the data in this paper is mainly based on these sources it means that the number 
of people living alone is lower than had the data been collected using the 
housekeeping definition.  
 There are some additional challenges to the Nordic household data. One is the 
fact that it is not possible to know for sure who are cohabiting unless they have 
children together. The Nordic standard is that two of opposite sex who live together, 
with an age gap of 15 years or less, who are not related in any other way and do not 
live together with other adults are considered cohabiters. A further group that is 
problematic is students. In Norway, for example, students who live away from home 
can choose whether they want to be registered with their parents or at the place of 
residence. In Sweden they are required to register at their actual place of residence but 
it is estimated that around 100 000 student fail to do so. In Denmark there is also a 
problem with the nursing home population as the majority are living in nursing 
apartments where the residents are registered as living alone instead of living in an 
institution. This inflates the number of elderly living by themselves.  In Norway those 
who have a spouse are registered at the spouse’s address instead of at the nursing 
home, making nursing home statistics unreliable.  
 In the AGHON project we distinguish 7 household positions4: living as a 
dependent child (up to 25 years of age), living alone, living with a spouse, cohabiting, 
being a lone parent, living in another type of private household and living in an 
institution for the elderly. In the probabilistic household forecast for Denmark and 
Finland that we computed as part of the AGHON project (Christiansen and Keilman, 
                                                 
2 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/fam/fammethods.htm 
3 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/fam/fammethods.htm 
4 These categories refer to living arrangement not marital status. 
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2013), we used data from the Danish and Finnish household registers, respectively. 
Having these register data made such a distinction of household positions possible. In 
the current paper I draw on data from many different sources including population 
censuses and sample surveys. Therefore, using household categories consistent with 
those employed in the AGHON project, is not feasible throughout.  
3. Main developments 
During the past 50 years there has been a strong growth in the number of households 
in the Nordic countries. During the period 1960-2010 the number of households grew 
by 65% in Denmark, 80% in Sweden and more than doubled in Finland and Norway.  
During the same period the population grew by 15% in Norway, 10% in Sweden and 
by 8% in Denmark and Finland. The much stronger growth in the number of 
households than in the population meant that the average household size fell sharply 
from around 3 in 1960 to around 2 in 2010. The majority of this decrease took place 
prior to 1990.  Sweden has throughout the period had the lowest average household 
size, with a starting value of 2.9 falling to 1.96 in 2010. At the other end of the scale, 
Norway had an average household size of 2.3 in 2010 down from 3.3 in 1960, Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Average household size 1960-2010 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden.   
 
An important reason for the observed decrease in the average household size, during 
the 50 years from 1960 to 2010, is the stark increase in the proportion who live alone. 
We see that in 2010 they amount to 18% in Norway and Denmark, 19% in Finland 
and 25% in Sweden. This is, however, a strong increase from 1960 when less than 5% 
of the population in Norway and Finland and less than 10% of the Danes and Swedes 
lived alone.   
The stark increase in the number of one-person households is mirrored by a sharp 
decline in the number of households with more than two inhabitants.  In Sweden, for 
example, the share that lives in three person households or households with four or 
more inhabitants have halved since 1960, Figure 2. The share of two-person 
households has, on the other hand, been fairly stable during the 50 year period.  The 
same pattern holds true in Norway and Denmark.  In Finland, there has in addition to 
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the strong growth in the share of single person households also been a ten percentage 
points growth in the number of two-person households during this period. However, 
starting out from a much higher level there has been a far steeper decline in the share 
living in households with four or more members.  
 
Figure 2. Households by size Sweden 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Sweden.   
 
4.  A closer look at particular age groups 
In order to look more closely at why average household size has fallen, I will consider 
the young, the middle-aged and the elderly separately. One of the most important 
trends at young adult ages is the postponement of marriage. During the last four 
decades the average age of first marriage has risen from around 20 to above 30 for 
women, being a few years higher for men. This does not mean that couples are not 
moving in toghether, for example in Norway, we have not observed any increase in 
the median age at which young adults move in with their first partner across the 
cohorts born from the 1930s onwards (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010: Noack and 
Seierstad, 2003; Dommermuth, Noack and Wiik, 2009).  However, data from the 
Danish household register spanning the last three decades show that the decrease in 
the share of young adults who are married has not been fully offset by the increase in 
the proportion cohabiting, which mean that the share of young adults living alone has 
also grown, Figure 3.  This growth in the share of young people living alone could also 
be due to a later age at leaving home, however the median age at leaving the parental 
home has been stable across cohorts born in all the Nordic since the 1950s (Billari and 
Liefbroer, 2010) nor has the proportion of young Danes in their 20s living at home 
(not shown). 
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Figure 3. Household shares, Danish women aged 25-29 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Denmark.  
 
The vast majority of young couples who decide to move in together nowadays start off 
living as cohabiting partners and do not marry directly. In Norway, in the cohort born 
1980-84 90% of those who have lived with a partner started off cohabiting. The same 
was true for 60% of those born 1950-54, 24 % of those born in the 1940s and only 9% 
of those born in the 1930s. This shift happened even earlier in Denmark and Sweden, 
where around 20% of those born in the 1930s cohabited before marrying rising to 
more than 80% in the 1950-1959 cohorts (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010; Dommermuth, 
Noack and Wiik, 2009). It is well known that cohabiting relationships are less stable 
than married relationships. For example, a Norwegian study found that one in four 
cohabiters had plans of breaking up with their partner, compared to 12% of the 
married (Wiik and Noack, 2011). The reason might be both that it is easier to leave a 
cohabiting partner than to go through a divorce, and that those who choose to marry 
are those who are most pleased with the quality of the relationship. The fact that 
cohabiting relationships are more likely to end means that a larger proportion of young 
adults experience periods living alone following break-ups.  
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Figure 4. Living arrangements, Danish women aged 45-49 living in different 
household positions
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Denmark  
 
For the middle aged there has also been a decline in the proportion married which has 
not been fully offset by the increase in the share cohabiting, Figure 4. This means that 
the increase in union dissolutions has led to a rise in the proportion of one-person 
households and lone parents.  The increase in the proportion cohabiting among the 
middle aged is a result of a growth in the share of people in these age groups who have 
never married, especially in Sweden (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008), but is mainly due 
higher divorce rates, as those who repartner following a divorce are more likely to 
cohabit.  
Considering the age specific divorce rates for Norwegian men, we see that the 
rates are higher for all age groups in 2006-10 than they were in 1982-87, especially for 
the middle aged, Figure 5. In Finland there has also been an increase at all ages, but 
there the young couples have seen the starkest increase (not shown).   
 
Figure 5. Age specific divorce rates (number of divorces per 1000 married men)- 
Norwegian men 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
The share of Danish men who live in a household where there are children present has 
decreaced at all ages compared to the mid 1980s, Figure 6. The decline is especially 
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marked at the young and middle ages.  The curve now peaks at 66% around age 40 
compared to 75% in 1985. The smaller proportion  of young men who live with 
children is to a large extent caused by the postponement of childbearing we have seen 
during the last decades. At higer age an important cause is the increasing break up of 
couples and the fact that it is still most common for the mother to get custody of the 
children. There has also been a tendency for the divorces to take place at an earlier 
stage of marriage than before (Olsen, Larsen and Lange, 2005) Although some of 
these men do find a new partner and have more children or become step-fathers, in 
2008, 65% of Danish fathers who did not live with their children were single (Petersen 
and Nielsen, 2008).  In addition, there has been an incerease in the share of men who 
remain childless. The same has been observed in Norway were  there has been an 
increse in the proportion of men who are childless at age 40 from about 18%  of the 
1950 cohort to 26% of the 1960 cohort (Skrede, 2004). Although men can become 
fathers after this age few become first time fathers after age 40.  
 
Figure 6: Share of Danish men who live with children 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Denmark. Note: The high 
proportion at young ages is mainly due to living with siblings.    
 
For the cohorts of women born between 1940 to 1968, cohort fertility has been 
remarkably stable, see Figure 7. Norway has seen the largest fall, from 2.5 for the 
cohorts born during the second world war to 2 today. In the other countries there has 
hardly been any change at all during the period - for example in Sweden there has been 
a decrease in average number of children of 0.1. At the same time there has not been a 
rise in the share of women who remain childless, except for a slight increase for those 
born in 1950 and after. For the cohorts born 1955-59 the proportion who had not had 
a first child at age 40 varied between 12% in Norway and 17% in Finland (Andersson 
et al., 2008). The age pattern of childbearing has however changed profoundly across 
cohorts. Among those born in the 1930s and 1940s the median age at first birth was 
below age 25, rising to nearly 30 among those born in the 1970s (Billari and Liefbroer, 
2010).  
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This means that the majority of women still become mothers, although they do so at a 
later age, and as noted earlier, a growing proportion spend some of their years with 
dependent children as single mothers. 
 
Figure 7: Cohort fertility in the Nordic countries - women (birth cohort on the x-axis) 
 
Source: Data from Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway and 
Statistics Sweden.   
 
At the highest ages,  there has been an increase in the proportion of both men and 
women who are married (I here consider marital status as cohabiting is still rare among 
the elderly), Figures 8 and 9.  For men the rise has been in the magnitude of ten 
percentage points in all four countries. Sweden and Finland have witnessed equally 
large growth for women as for men, whereas in Denmark and Norway it has been 
about half that of men. Although the proportion married has increased among both 
women and men, the share in this age group is still much higher for men. Whereas 
between  60 and 65 percent of men aged 75+ were married, this is true for only 
around  a quarter of women. Among men the increase is first and foremost caused by 
a falling share of widowers.  For women the main driving force is a decrease in the 
proportion  never-married.  
 
Figure 8: Proportion of men75+ married(per cent)- Marital status 
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, 
Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden.   
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Figure 9: Proportion of women 75+ married (per cent)- Marital status 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, 
Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden.   
 
The increase in couples  will, cet par, lead to larger household sizes among the elderly. 
However, whereas living with other relatives was common among the elderly in the 
1960s and 70s the vast majority now live alone, Figure 10. It is no longer usual for 
single elderly to move in with relatives. The reasons for this can be both a greater wish 
for privacy and greater affluence. This trend reinforces  the decline in household sizes. 
All in all more elderly live alone. Of course this is partly caused by an increase in the 
proportion of those aged 80+ who are in the highest age brackets but there has also 
been a decline in the proportion living with others than a spouse across  the age 
groups 80-84, 85-89 and 90+. As the elderly now tend to live in rather small 
households, ageing, per see, has also accelerated  the fall in average household size.   
 
Figure 10: Share of Norwegians 80+ living with others 
 
Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
Comparing the development during the last decades for Finnish women in the age 
groups 80-84 and 90+, respectively, we see that the proportion living alone has been 
stable among the youngest age group for the last ten years but has been increasing 
steadily for those aged 90 and over, Figures 11 and 12.  The proportion married has 
increased among those aged 80-84 but has been low and fairly stable among the oldest 
old. The proportion living with others than their spouse has decreased for both age 
groups and the share of those aged 90+ living in institutions has decreased. Indeed, 
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the share in the age group 90+ who live alone is now nearing the share in the age 
group 80-84.   
 
 
Figure 11: Living arrangements among Finnish women aged 80-84. 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Finland. 
 
 
Figure 12: Living arrangements among Finnish women aged 90+. 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from Statistics Finland.    
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5.  Children’s living arrangements 
Beyond affecting adults, these changes in household structure also imply great changes 
in children’s living-arrangements. The family constellations children grow up in have 
been shown to influence both their well-being and school results (e.g. Jonsson and 
Gähler, 1997; Cherlin, 1999) as well as a number of adult outcomes (e.g. Amato and 
Keith, 1991; Reneflot, 2009).  
 
Figure 13: Proportion of children born to unmarried mothers 
Source: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden.   
 
 Whereas in 1960 nearly 90% of Swedish children were born to married 
mothers, the majority now have mothers who were unwed at the time of birth. In 
Norway in 1960 less than 4% had parents that were not married at the time of birth. 
In 2010, 56% of children were born out of wedlock - 44% to cohabiting parents and 
11% to single mothers. The lowest proportion of children are born out of wedlock in 
Finland where 59% still have mothers who are married at time of birth, Figure 13.  
Having cohabiting parents increases the risk that a child will experience a parental 
break-up.  
 Although the proportion living with both parents has decreased it is still by far 
the most common living arrangement for children. For example 72% of Danish 
children lived with both parents in 2010, down from 83% in 1980. For those not living 
in a nuclear family in 2010 it was most common to live with only the mother (16%), or 
the mother and a partner (7%). The corresponding numbers in 1980 were 7% and 3%. 
The proportion that lives with only the father, or the father and a partner, has not 
increased much and in 2010 still constituted only 3% of children. The proportion that 
lives in each family type does, however, vary with age. In 2007, 90% of Danish infants 
lived with both their parents whereas this was only the case for 60% of 17-year olds.  
Looking in more detail at 15 year olds’ living-arrangements, we see that between 1980 
and 2010 the large increases have been in the shares living with only their mothers or 
with the mother and a partner. The first category now constitutes 20%, up from 11% 
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in 1980. The proportion living with the mother and a stepfather has more than tripled 
from 3.6% in 1980 to 12% in 2010, Figures 14 and 15.  
 Statistics on the proportion of children experiencing a parental split-up are 
hard to find. However a Swedish study of 30 000 couples who had their first child in 
2000 found that 27% had separated ten years later (Statistics Sweden, 2012). Of 17 
year olds in Denmark in 2008, 53% had lived their whole lives together with both their 
parents. 41% had at some point in their lives lived with only their mother (Petersen 
and Nielsen, 2008). 
 Although it has become more common to experience parental break-ups and 
to live in single parent and reconstructed families the vast majority of children, 87% in 
Denmark in 2010, is an only child or has only siblings who share the same biological 
parents. However, by the age of 17 a quarter of Danish children have either step or 
half siblings (Petersen and Nielsen, 2008).  
 
Figure 14: Danish 15 year olds’ living arrangements 1980 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark  
 
Figure 15: Danish 15 year olds’ living arrangements 2010 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark  
Father and mother
Lone mother
Mother and partner
Lone father
Father and partner
Father and mother
Lone mother
Mother and partner
Lone father
Father and partner
14                                                                                      Solveig Glestad Christiansen 
 
 
6. Future developments 
As part of the AGHON project we computed probabilistic household forecasts for 
Denmark and Finland with a 30 year horizon (up to 2037 in Denmark and 2039 in 
Finland). Full details of the method used and results are available in Christiansen and 
Keilman (2013).  We assumed constant transition rates during the 30 year period, 
based on averages over the period 2004-2008 for Finland and 2002-2006 for Denmark. 
However, in order to achieve consistency with the national population projections, we 
set the total number of births, deaths, immigrations, and emigrations in each 
projection interval equal to the numbers from Statistics Denmark’s population 
projection 2010 for Denmark and Statistics Finland’s population projection for 2009 
for Finland. The results show that the number of private households is expected to 
grow by 27% in Finland and 13% in Denmark during the 30-year period.  This means 
an increase in the number of private households from 2.5 to 2.8 million (80% 
prediction interval 2.6-3.0 million) in Denmark, and from 2.5 to 3.1 million (80% 
prediction interval 3.0-3.3 million) in Finland. Taken together with the expected 
increase in population size, this leads to a fall in mean household size from 2.16 to 
2.07 (80% prediction interval 2.01-2.28) in Denmark and from 2.14 to 1.97 (80% 
prediction interval 1.79-1.99) in Finland. When considering the growth in the numbers 
of private households of various types during the 30 year period, the strongest increase 
is expected for the number of one-person households: 31% and 50% in Denmark and 
Finland, respectively. However, whereas the number of married couple households is 
expected to grow by 12% in Finland, a slight fall is expected in Denmark. As a result, 
married couple households are expected to become less important, numerically 
speaking: falling from 40% to 34% of all private households in Denmark and from 38% 
to 33% in Finland. The fraction of single person households is, on the other hand, 
expected to rise from 38% to 44% in Denmark and from 41% to 49% in Finland. The 
shares of cohabiting and lone parents are expected to remain remarkably stable during 
the 30 year period, Figures 16 and 17. 
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Figure 16. One-person households, cohabiting and married couple households and 
lone parent households, as a share of all private households. Observed (1987, 1997, 
2007) and average5 projected values (2017, 2027, 2037), Denmark. 
 
 Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Denmark 
 
 
Figure 17. One-person households, cohabiting and married couple households and 
lone parent households, as a share of all private households. Observed (1989, 1999, 
2009) and average projected values (2019, 2029, 2039), Finland. 
 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland  
 
 
                                                 
5 We calculated 3000 sample paths for the number of people in each household position.  
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7.  Uncertainty 
Probabilistic household projections, in addition to projecting the development of 
different household types, also quantify the uncertainty these projections entail. Our 
results show that the numbers of household consisting of married and one-person 
households are the most certain, and single parents and other private households are 
the most uncertain.  
 The relative uncertainty is generally largest for the youngest age groups. For 
young adults the greatest uncertainty concerns single parents and least uncertainty 
regarding the number of cohabiting and those living alone. For the middle aged there 
is also greatest uncertainty concerns single parents and the married and those living 
alone are the most certain.  For the elderly there is a large amount of uncertainty 
concerning the cohabiting, the number living in nursing homes and the number living 
in other private households, whereas the most certain are the married and those living 
alone. In general, household positions containing a lot of people are easier to predict 
than the less numerous ones.   
 
8.  Summary 
The Nordic countries have seen a rise in the number of households during the last 
decades which has far exceeded the population growth. This has led to a steep decline 
in the average household size from between 3.3 and 2.9 in 1960 to between 1.96 and 
2.3 in 2010. This has been driven by a strong increase in one-person households and a 
fall in households consisting of three or more members. The reasons for this is to be 
found in the increase in cohabitation and postponement of marriage and childbearing 
among the young, increased divorce risks and the fact that the elderly less often live 
with relatives. Ageing has also played a role as it has increased the proportion of the 
population who live in small households. 
A larger proportion of children are born out of wedlock and experience the 
breakup of their parents’ relationship. However the majority of children still live with 
both their parents. 
 Table 1 and 2 give a summary, from multistate life tables6, of how an “average” 
Finn and Dane spend their lives, based on data (transition rates) from 2002-2006 in 
Denmark and 2004-2008 in Finland. Table 1 shows that the Finns spend a little more 
than a quarter of their lives living as a child, a third living with a spouse, 11% 
cohabiting and around 20% living alone. The Danes spend a somewhat larger fraction 
of their lives living as a child and a little less living with a spouse (Table 2). In both 
countries the majority of children are born by mothers who live with a spouse, 
                                                 
6 In multistate life tables there are multiple states between which transitions occur subject to specified 
transition rates. This allows us to estimate the expected proportion of life spent in each state for a 
representative individual, given that he or she were subjected to the specified transition rates from the 
moment of birth until the moment of death. 
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although the difference between births by married and cohabiting women is smaller in 
Denmark than in Finland.  
 
 
Table 1: Percentage of life time spent in various household positions, and number of 
children by mother’s household position, Denmark 2002-2006 
 
 Child Single Cohabiting Married Lone 
parent 
Other Institution All 
(=100%) 
    %    years 
Men 29 19 11 31 1 8 0.3 75.1 
Women 26 21 11 30 5 6 0.7 79.9 
         
    children     
 0.02 0.08 0.7 0.83 0.08 0.16 0.00 1.88 
Source: Calculations from the AGHON-project  
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of life time spent in various household positions, and number of 
children by mother’s household position, Finland 2004-2008 
 Child Single Cohabiting Married Lone 
parent 
Other Institution All 
(=100%) 
    %    years 
Men 26 20 11 35 1 6 1 74.8 
Women 22 22 11 34 4 5 1 82.3 
         
    children     
 0.00 0.09 0.42 1.27 0.10 0.05 0.00 1.93 
Source: Calculations from the AGHON-project  
 
  
18                                                                                      Solveig Glestad Christiansen 
 
 
References 
Amato, P.R. and B. Keith, 1991. “Parental divorce and adult well-being of children: A 
metaanalysis”, Journal of Marriage and the Family, 53: 43-58. 
 
Andersson, G., L. B. Knudsen, G. Neyer, K. Teschner, M. Rønsen, T. Lappegård, K. 
Skrede and A. Vikat, 2009. “Cohort fertility patterns in the Nordic countries”, 
Demographic Research, 20 (14): 313-352.  
 
Billari, F. C. and A. C. Liefbroer (2010) “Towards a new pattern of transition to 
adulthood?”, Advances in Life Course Research 15, 59-75. 
 
Cherlin, A.J. 1999. “Going to extremes: Family structure, children’s well-being, and 
social science”, Demography, 36: 421-428. 
 
Christiansen, S. and N. Keilman (2013) “Probabilistic household forecasts based on 
register data: The case of Denmark and Finland”, forthcoming in Demographic Research.  
 
Dommermuth, L., T.  Noack, and K. Aa. Wiik, 2009. “Samlivsetablering – nye og 
vedvarende mønste: Gift, samboer eller “bare” kjæreste? Samfunnsepeilet, 1/2009:13-19. 
 
Drefahl, S. (2012) "Do the Married Really Live Longer? The Role of Cohabitation and 
Socioeconomic Status”, Journal of Marriage and Family, 74 (3): 462–475.  
 
Prskawetz, A.  J., Leiwen and B. C. O'Neill, 2004.  “Demographic composition and 
projections of car use in Austria”, Vienna Yearbook of Demography, 175-201. 
 
Grundy, E. 2001. “Living arrangements and the health of older persons in developed 
countries”, Population Bulletin, UN, 42–43: 311–329. 
 
Grundy, E., and. M. Jital, 2007. “Socio-demographic variations in moves to 
institutional care 1991-2001: a record linkage study from England and Wales”, Age and 
Ageing, 36:424-430. 
 
Iwashyna T.J. and N.A. Christakis (2003) “Marriage, widowhood, and health-care use”, 
Social Science and Medicine, 57(11), 2137–2147. 
 
Jonsson, J. O. and M. Gähler, 1997. ”Family dissolution, family reconstitution and 
children’s educational careers: Recent evidence for Sweden”, Demography, 34 (2):277-
293.  
 
Joutsenniemi, K. 2007.  “Living arrangements and health, Publications of the National 
Public Health Institute”, 15/2007, Department of Health and Functional Capacity, 
National Public Health Institute, Helsinki, Finland and Department of Public Health, 
University of Helsinki, Finland. http://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/27193 
Household and family development in the Nordic countries: An overview                19 
Koskinen , S.,  K. Joutsenniemi , T.  Martelin and P. Martikainen, 2007. “Mortality 
differences according to living arrangements”, International Journal of Epidemiology, 36 (6): 
1255-1264. 
 
Lakdawalla, D., and  T. Philipson, 1999. “Ageing and the growth of long-term care”, 
NBER Working Paper Series, National Bureau of Economic Research. (Reports 95/21). 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6980 
 
Lakdawalla, D., D. P. Goldman, J. Bhattacharya, M. Hurd,  G. Joyce and C.  Panis,  
2003. “Forecasting the nursing home population”, Medical Care. 41: 8-20. 
 
Lund, R., P. Due, J. Modvig, B. E. Holstein, M. T. Damsgard and P. K. Andersen, 
2002. “Cohabitation and marital status as predictors of mortality- an eight year follow-
up study”, Social Science and Medicine. 55: 673-679.  
 
MacKellar, F. L., W. Lutz, C. Prinz and A. Goujon, 1995. “Population, Households 
and 2CO  Emissions”, Population and Development Review, 21 (4): 849-865.   
 
Mastakaasa, A. and S. Næss, 2011. Ekteskap og familie. In: S. Næss, T. Moum and J. 
Eriksen (eds) Livskvalitet: Forskning om det gode liv. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.  
Noack , T. and A. Seierstad, 2003. “Heller jeg enn vi?”, Samfunnsspeilet, 2003:03, 
Statistics Norway.   
 
Olsen, A. L., D.  Larsen and A. Lange, 2005. “Vielser og skilsmisser- børn i 
skilsmisser”, Statistics Denmark. 
 
O’Neill, B. and B. Chen, 2002. “Demographic determinants of household energy use 
in the United States”, Population Development Review, 28, suppl., 53–88. 
 
Petersen, A. N. and T. M. Nielsen, 2008. “Børns familier”, Temapublikasjon. 2:2008, 
Statistics Denmark.  
 
Prior, P. M. and Hayes, B. C. (2003) “The Relationship Between Marital Status and 
Health An Empirical Investigation of Differences in Bed Occupancy Within Health 
and Social Care Facilities in Britain, 1921-1991”, Journal of Family Issues, 24(1), 124-148. 
 
Reneflot, A. 2009. “Childhood family structure and reproductive behaviour in early 
adulthood in Norway”, European Sociological Review. 10: 1-14.  
 
Skrede, K. 2004. “Færre menn blir fedre”, Økonomisk analyse 6:2004, Statistics Norway.  
 
Sobotka, T. and L. Toulemon (2008) “Overview chapter 4: Changing family and 
partnership behaviour: Common trends and persistent diversity across Europe”, 
Demographic Research, 19 (6): 85-138. 
20                                                                                      Solveig Glestad Christiansen 
 
 
Soons, J. P. M. and A. C. Lifbroer, 2008. “Together is better? Effects of relationship 
status and resources on young adults’ well-being”, Journal of Social and Personal 
Relationships. 25(4): 603-624.  
 
Stack, S. and J.R. Eshelman, 1998. “Marital status and happiness: A 17-Nation Study”, 
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 60 (2): 527-536.  
 
Statistics Sweden, 2008. “Ungdomars flytt hemifrån”, Demografiska rapporter. 5:2008.   
 
Statistics Sweden, 2012. “Sambo, barn, gift, isär? Parbildning och separationer bland 
förstegångsföreldrar”, Demografiska rapporter. 1:2012.  
 
Wier M, M. Lenzen, J. Munksgaard, S. Smed, 2001. “Effects of Household 
Consumption Patterns on 2CO  Requirements”, Economic Systems Research. 13 (3): 259-
274. 

  
Summary of  the studies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper I: Probabilistic household forecasts using register data: The 
case of Denmark and Finland  
 
The purpose of this paper is to forecast the household structure in Denmark and Finland 30 
years into the future. The forecasts are based on data from the Danish and Finnish household 
registers. Thus far the vast majority of household forecasts have not had access to household 
register data and have been based on sample surveys. As a consequence, researchers have 
been restricted to basing their transition probabilities on marital status instead of household 
position and have made a number of simplifying assumptions. Employing high quality 
household register data encompassing the entire Danish and Finnish population, respectively, 
we are able to calculate quite reliable transition probabilities even for infrequent transitions. 
As the Danish household register has been in operation since the early 1980s, and its Finnish 
counterpart since the late 1980s, we also had access to household time series data spanning 
more than two decades. Having detailed time series data meant that we could estimate the 
uncertainty in the future distribution of the population across household positions in more 
detail than earlier studies have been able to do. Combining the uncertainty parameters with 
expected shares computed in a deterministic household forecast, we simulate sample paths for 
the household shares for each age and sex. These paths are then combined with simulations 
from a stochastic population forecast covering the same period to obtain the predicted 
numbers of households (one-person households, cohabiting couple households, married 
couple household, single person household and other private households) as well as persons in 
each household position by age and sex. 
The results show that the share of households which are one-person households will rise, and 
the proportion of married couple households will continue to fall. The fractions of cohabiting 
and single parent households are quite stable over the projection period. In terms of 
uncertainty, the number of married couple households and one-person households are the 
most certain as they are the most numerous, and single parent and other private households 
the most uncertain. The more detailed uncertainty parameters derived from the time series 
analysis of household data mean that prediction intervals are narrower than in earlier 
probabilistic household forecasts based on survey data.  
 
Paper II: Is divorce green? Marital dissolution, demographic 
dynamics and energy use 
 
This paper addresses the environmental impact of changes in the household structure – more 
specifically how a change in divorce and union dissolution rates impacts on the demand for 
domestic energy. In contrast to earlier inquiries into this topic, we consider not only the higher 
per capita energy use resulting from a loss of economies of scale when one household is split 
into smaller households, but also the inhibiting effect divorce has on fertility at the individual 
level. We use household forecasts taking the transition rates observed today as the Benchmark 
and compare them to scenarios with higher or lower divorce rates, holding other transition 
rates constant. The birth rates vary with the household position of the mother according to 
observed patterns. The projected number of households is then combined with data on 
domestic energy consumption broken down by household size to estimate the total Danish 
domestic energy use.  
In addition to household register data, data from the Danish consumer expenditure survey are 
utilised. Our finding is that the dominant effect in the short run is the higher per capita 
domestic energy use resulting from smaller households being less energy efficient, confirming 
the results of earlier studies. However in the long run, higher divorce rates lead to a lower 
energy use than in the Benchmark scenario and lower divorce rates lead to higher energy use 
than in the Benchmark scenario.  Holding the number of births constant across scenarios, 
there is no such reversal, and the domestic energy use is higher in the scenarios with higher 
divorce rates than in the Benchmark scenario throughout the projection period. Taking the 
effect of divorce and union dissolution rates on fertility into account therefore leads to a 
different conclusion in the long run than do the earlier studies based on cross-sectional data. 
Although one might argue that large changes in divorce rates in developed countries are 
unlikely, divorce rates are on the increase in many parts of the world and knowledge about the 
impact on energy consumption is therefore important. 
 
 
Paper III: The impact of children’s sex composition on parents’ 
mortality 
 
In study III, I examine whether the sex of one’s children is associated with one’s mortality . 
Earlier studies have found that those with children have lower mortality than the childless (at 
least at low parities). However, few studies have inquired into whether there is a link between 
the children’s gender and mortality, and the majority of these studies have been based on 
small samples and historical populations. This study is novel in that it addresses this question 
using register data encompassing an entire contemporary western population (the Norwegian).  
Gender preferences are generally not very strong in western societies, with the majority of 
parents having either no preference or preferring having at least one of each sex. Children’s 
sex can still have both biological (for the mother) and social implications for the parents. The 
likelihood of divorce, time spent with children, number of hours spent working, weight and 
alcohol consumption are examples of areas earlier studies have found to be linked to 
children’s sex composition.   
I find limited support for the hypothesis that mortality is linked to the sex composition, 
namely that having only girls, compared to having at least one child of each sex is associated 
with higher mortality among women with two or more children. This is also the case for 
mothers who had their first child as a teenager and only have sons. Mothers of two daughters 
and no sons have a higher mortality than mothers of two sons and no daughter. However, 
mothers of four daughters and no sons have a lower mortality than mothers of four sons and 
no daughters. Finally, having children of only one sex is associated with higher mortality for 
mothers in the 1980s.  
This analysis contributes to the field of study inquiring into the link between family and 
mortality, particularly the growing literature on the association with children, by showing that 
gender composition can have a mediating effect. It also fits into the tradition of studying how 
far-reaching effects the gender composition of one’s children may have on one’s life. 
 
Paper IV: The association between grandparenthood and mortality 
 
Paper IV inquiries further into the link between family and mortality by addressing another 
aspect of one’s children - namely whether they in turn have children. Very few studies have 
so far looked at whether there is a link between grandparenthood and health, and the majority 
of these studies have focused on US families where the grandparents have taken over parental 
responsibility for their grandchildren. No-one has so far studied whether mortality is linked to 
being a grandparent. In order to address this question I employ Norwegian register data. 
The result shows that being a grandfather is associated with higher mortality. The strength of 
the association is not dependent on number of grandchildren or the number of sets of 
grandchildren. However, there is a mediating effect of age with young grandfathers having a 
stronger mortality disadvantage than older grandfathers. Young grandmothers also have 
higher mortality than mothers who are not grandmothers, as do grandmothers who are married 
or who have many children. This is also the case when considering age at becoming a 
grandparent. Those who became grandfathers early display a stronger mortality disadvantage 
than those who became grandfathers later in life and for women becoming a grandmother 
after age 50 is associated with a mortality advantage. Controlling for characteristics of the 
middle generation does not remove the associations. The results are surprising given that the 
vast majority of the research on grandparenthood emphasises the positive aspects of being a 
grandparent such as a greater satisfaction with life, less loneliness and more contact with the 
middle generation.   
I have also looked at the association between grandparenthood and self-rated health using data 
from the Norwegian Gender and Generation Survey. As with mortality, being a grandparent is 
linked to poorer self-rated health for men, especially for those who became a grandfather 
early in life. Grandmothers who have many grandchildren or became grandmothers prior to 
age 45 are also more likely to report poor health.  
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Probabilistic household forecasts based on register data - the case of 
Denmark and Finland 
Solveig Glestad Christiansen1 
Nico Keilman2 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Household forecasts are important for public planning and for predicting consumer 
demand.  
 
OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this paper is to compute probabilistic household forecasts for Finland 
and Denmark, taking advantage of unique housing register data covering the whole 
populations dating back to the 1980s. A major advantage is that we do not have to rely 
on small population samples, and we can get quite reliable estimates even for infrequent 
transitions. A further merit is having time series containing the population in different 
household positions (dependent child, living with a spouse, living in a consensual 
union, living alone, lone parent, living in other private household and institutional 
households) by age and sex.  
 
METHODS 
These series enable us to estimate the uncertainty in the future distribution of the 
population across household positions. Combining these uncertainty parameters with 
expected shares computed in a deterministic household forecast, we simulate 3000 
sample paths for the household shares for each age and sex. These paths are then 
combined with 3000 simulations from a stochastic population forecast covering the 
same period to obtain the predicted number of households and persons in each 
household position by age and sex.  
 
RESULTS 
According to our forecasts, we expect a strong growth in the number of private 
households during a 30-year period, of 27% in Finland and 13% in Denmark. The 
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number of households consisting of a married couple or a person who lives alone are 
the most certain, and single parents and other private households are the most uncertain.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Our aim is to compute probabilistic household forecasts for Denmark and Finland, 
using register data. Household forecasts are useful for planning housing supply, energy 
use, and the demand for consumer durables (e.g. King 1999; Muller, Gnanasekaran, and 
Knapp 1999; O’Neill and Chen 2002). For the elderly, the household position also has 
an effect on their demand for places in nursing homes (e.g. Lakdawalla and Philipson 
1999; Lakdawalla et al. 2003; Grundy and Jital 2007). 
Traditionally, household forecasts have been computed by models that, roughly 
speaking, can be divided in two groups: household headship rate models, and household 
transition models (Van Imhoff et al. 1995). Compared to headship rate models, which 
are static in nature, transition models have the advantage that they explicitly describe 
the dynamics of the household composition of the population. 
Both types of models are widely used for computing deterministic forecasts. A 
projection of the number of households of a certain type in a given year in the future is 
computed as one number (or just a few numbers: see section 2). Such a deterministic 
forecast, however, does not give an accurate view of forecast uncertainty. The future is 
inherently uncertain, and hence probabilistic methods have to be used. Alho and 
Keilman (2010) have recently developed a method for computing probabilistic 
household forecasts. They applied their method to Norwegian data. One important 
drawback of their application is that the uncertainty assessments were based on limited 
data, and simplifying assumptions had to be made (see section 2). 
The purpose of this paper is to improve on the approach of Alho and Keilman by 
taking advantage of high quality data from the population registers and housing 
registers of Denmark and Finland. Both countries have register data covering the whole 
populations dating back to the 1980s. The registers contain information about persons 
in every dwelling, including all flats in apartment blocks, each having its own unique 
address (Lind 2008; Niemi 2011). We constructed time series for household parameters 
and analysed the prediction errors in those time series. This allowed us to assess the 
expected errors in the household forecasts for the two countries. 
We forecast, with a 30 year horizon, the number of people occupying the 
following household positions: dependent child, living with a spouse, living in a 
consensual union, living alone, lone mother or father, and living in other private 
household. In addition, the elderly can live in an institutional household. Our household 
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forecasts for Denmark and Finland form part of the AGHON project (Ageing 
Households and the Nordic welfare model (http://www.etla.fi/en/research-
projects/aging-households-nordic-welfare-model-aghon/).  
The aim of this project is to combine statistical analysis of household types with 
economic analysis of population ageing in Denmark and Finland. Probabilistic 
household forecasts, which describe the developments of different household types and 
quantify the uncertainty in these descriptions, are used jointly with computable general 
equilibrium models and partial models describing household behaviour under 
uncertainty. 
Following this introduction, the paper is divided into five sections. We give a brief 
overview of earlier work in the field of household forecasting in section 2. Section 3 
describes the methods used to forecast household shares and the population. In section 4 
we present the data employed in this paper. Section 5 gives some selected results from 
our household forecasts. Finally, section 6 summarises and draws some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Overview of earlier work 
As mentioned in the introduction, our model is similar to that used by Alho and 
Keilman (2010). This random share model can be characterized as a probabilistic and 
dynamic macro model that projects households of various types, as well as the 
population broken down by age, sex, and various household positions. Below we will 
briefly sketch the most important features of our model, as compared with other 
approaches to household forecasting. Extensive literature reviews of household 
projection models have been published by Jiang and O’Neill (2004), Bell, Cooper, and 
Les (1995), and Arminger and Galler (1991). Another useful reference is Van Imhoff et 
al. (1995). 
Probabilistic household projection models are new to the literature, compared to 
deterministic models. De Beer and Alders were the first to publish a probabilistic 
household forecast (see Alders 1999, 2001, and De Beer and Alders 1999). They 
combined a probabilistic population forecast with random shares that distributed the 
population probabilistically over six household positions: individuals could live as a 
child with parents, live alone, live with a partner, as a lone parent or in an institution, or 
belong to another category. For instance, the authors computed the random variable for 
the number of lone mothers aged 40 years in 2015 as the product of two other random 
variables: the number of women aged 40 years in 2015 and the share of those women 
who live as a lone mother. Expected values for population variables and for the shares 
for specific household positions were obtained from observed time series, but the 
statistical distributions that were assumed for the shares were based on intuitive 
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reasoning. Perfect correlations across age and sex were assumed for the mortality rates, 
fertility rates, and migration numbers in the stochastic population forecasts, as well as 
for the random shares. In addition the authors assumed perfect correlation in the time 
dimension for the random shares. 
Scherbov and Ediev (2007) combined a probabilistic population forecast for the 
population broken down by age and sex with random headship rates. In demography a 
headship rate reflects the proportion of the population that is the head of the household, 
for a given combination of age and sex (United Nations 1973; Jiang and O’Neill 2004): 
see below. Like De Beer and Alders, Scherbov and Ediev based a large part of their 
uncertainty distributions on intuition. In contrast, our contribution is to show how 
uncertainty in the forecast of the shares that distribute the population over several 
household positions can be modelled as a stochastic process, the parameters of which 
can be derived from time series models estimated from population register data.  
In our view probabilistic forecast models are more appropriate for computing 
forecasts than deterministic forecast models. There are many possible future household 
developments for a given population, but some of these are more likely than others. As 
opposed to a deterministic forecast, which predicts only one number (or perhaps just a 
few: see below) for a certain year, a probabilistic forecast tells us how likely it is that 
future household numbers will be within a certain range. Information of this kind 
allows policy makers, planners, and other forecast users in the fields of housing, energy, 
social security etc. to take appropriate decisions, because some household variables are 
more difficult to predict, and hence more uncertain than others. It also guides them once 
actual developments start to deviate from the most likely path. New actions or updated 
plans are unnecessary as long as developments are likely to remain close to the 
expected future. Deterministic forecasts traditionally deal with forecast uncertainty by 
formulating alternative scenarios, usually in terms of a high and a low trajectory for 
some key input parameter, in addition to a most likely trajectory (Jiang and O’Neill 
2006). The drawback is that uncertainty is not quantified, and hence the user does not 
know how likely it is that the high trajectory will materialize, instead of the most likely 
trajectory. Moreover, the results are not plausible from a statistical point of view, as 
they implicitly assume perfect correlation across age, time, and type of household (Lee, 
1999; Alho et al. 2008).  
Our household model is a dynamic one, as opposed to static household models. 
Dynamic household models (also labelled as household transition models) deal 
explicitly with household events. A household event is defined as a change in 
household position that an individual experiences during a brief time interval. For 
instance, a person who lives as dependent child with his or her parents and starts to live 
with a cohabitee experiences the event of home leaving. A lone mother whose last child 
leaves home becomes a one-person household. Dynamic household models were first 
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developed in the 1980s, when existing multistate demographic models were applied to 
household analysis (Kuijsten and Vossen 1988). A prominent example of the group of 
dynamic household models is the LIPRO (“LIfe style PROjections”) model (Van 
Imhoff and Keilman 1991), which is based on the methodology of multistate 
demography but includes several extensions to solve the particular problems of 
household modelling. At present it is used by Statistics Netherlands for their official 
household forecasts (Van Duin and Harmsen 2009) and by The Office of National 
Statistics for their marital status projections for England & Wales 
(http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Population+Projections+by+M
arital+Status). Other dynamic models, which demand less detailed data, have been 
employed elsewhere (e.g. ProFamy: see Zeng et al. (2007)). In the current forecasts we 
have used the computer programme developed for LIPRO (version 4.0: see 
http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/Pages/NID/24/841.bGFuZz1VSw.html) to compute the 
expected values for our random household shares.  
The advantage of dynamic household models, as opposed to static models, is that 
they explicitly model household events. At the same time their data demands are 
relatively high. Most of the static models are of the headship rate type. Headship rate 
models compute future numbers of households by combining an independent forecast 
of the population (broken down by age, sex, and often also by marital status) with 
future values for the proportions of household heads in the population (specific of age, 
sex, etc.). These models have a long tradition in demography (US National Resources 
Planning Committee 1938; United Nations 1973; Keilman, Kuijsten, and Vossen1988). 
Because of their modest data demands they are more often used than dynamic models 
(e.g. Jiang and O’Neill 2004), in spite of the fact that processes of household change 
remain a black box. 
A final distinction is that between microsimulation models and macrosimulation 
models. Microsimulation household models (Wachter 1987; Galler 1988; Fredriksen 
1998) take the individual as the unit of analysis, and attach a number of characteristics 
to each person: age, sex, survival status, number of children, household position, etc. 
Pointers3 indicate which individuals live together in a given household. The model 
updates these characteristics (except for those that are fixed, such as sex) for each 
individual by means of random draws from assumed probability distributions for events 
such as death, the birth of a(n additional) child, change in household position, etc. In 
this sense the microsimulation model is a probabilistic model, but it only captures 
Poisson uncertainty. The Poisson rates that determine the distributions (death rates, 
birth rates, rates for household events) are non-random. For this reason microsimulation 
models are less well suited to reflect forecast uncertainty, as in reality the rates tend to 
                                                          
3 Pointers are identification numbers. Every household is assigned an identification number and this number is 
then given to all members of that household.  
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change over time in an often unpredictable way. The advantage of the microsimulation 
models is that they are very well suited to map complex household, family, and kin 
structures (Jiang and O’Neill 2004). But the data requirements are large, because the 
model is applied to a file with information about individual persons. A recent attempt to 
combine microsimulation and macrosimulation has resulted in the MicMac model 
(http://www.nidi.nl/smartsite.dws?id=24930&ver=&ch=NID&lang=UK). 
The model in this paper extends the work of Alho and Keilman (2010) for 
Norway, who estimated their household transition rates from panel data from around 
5000 households. Mortality rates, however, were estimated based on marital status data 
from the population register of Norway, together with a number of simplifying 
assumptions. A few other transition rates had to be borrowed from a deterministic 
dynamic household forecast for Norway published by Keilman and Brunborg (1995). 
A major advantage of having register data is that we do not have to rely on small 
population samples when calculating household transition rates. Having transition data 
for the total population and for many years means that we can get quite reliable 
estimates, even for infrequent transitions. A further merit of the register data we have in 
this case is the relatively long time series containing the population in different 
household positions. These series are used to estimate the uncertainty in the future 
distribution of the population across household positions. This is an improvement on 
the Alho and Keilman (2010) study in which uncertainty parameters were based on the 
empirical errors in the predicted household shares from an earlier Norwegian household 
forecast.  
Using register data, it is also clear that all the data are compiled using the same 
definition. When household data are taken from different sources, different definitions 
may have been used. For instance, one part of the data may have been based on a 
household-dwelling definition, where all those who live at the same address are 
member of the same private household. Other data sources may have used the 
housekeeping definition, where only those who take meals together and use common 
household facilities form a household. The first definition includes lodgers as part of the 
household of the landlord, whereas the second does not. Thus numbers of one-person 
households will show substantial differences depending on whether one takes the 
household-dwelling definition or the housekeeping definition of a private household. 
The same is true for numbers of large households. 
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3. Methods 
3.1 Brief overview of our approach 
We begin by computing deterministic household forecasts with a 30-year horizon for 
Finland and Denmark. We have set jump-off years to 2007 for Denmark and 2009 for 
Finland, which were the latest years for which we have reliable data. In 2008 there was 
a change in some definitions in Denmark, which makes the data from the years 2008 
and later difficult to compare to earlier data. The results of interest of the latter forecasts 
are the distributions of the population over several household positions. Each household 
position corresponds with one share. These shares are different for men and women in 
different age groups. Also, they change over time. In order to assess the level of 
uncertainty in the shares, we analyse time series data on the share for each household 
position broken down by age and sex. The time series models predict, among other 
things, the likelihood that a share will be different from its expected value by a certain 
amount. Also, the data enable us to estimate the correlations of the shares across ages 
and between the sexes. Correlations across household positions are dealt with in a 
specific manner: see Section 3.4. Using the shares computed in the deterministic 
population forecast and the estimated standard deviations and correlations, we simulate 
3000 sample paths for the household shares for each age and sex: see Section 3.5. These 
paths are then combined with 3000 simulations from an earlier computed stochastic 
population forecast that covers the same period. This gives the predicted number of 
persons in each household position. 
We will now explain in further detail each of the steps outlined above.  
 
 
3.2 Deterministic household forecast 
The population is divided into categories defined by sex, 5-year age groups up to 90+, 
and seven different household positions. Our particular choice for these household 
positions was governed by the requirements of the economic models developed within 
the AGHON project: see, for example, Højbjerg Jacobsen et al. (2011). The household 
positions are: 
 
1. CHLD – dependent child living with one or both parents (up to 25 years of 
age). 
2. SIN0 – person living in a one-person household.  
3. SIN+ – single mother or father (aged 15–75). 
4. COH – living in a consensual union with or without dependent children.  
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5. MAR – living with a spouse with or without dependent children. 
6. OTHR – living in a private household, but not in any of the positions described 
above. 
7. INST – living in an institution for the elderly (from 70 years of age). 
 
These categories refer to living arrangement and not marital status. For example, 
the category MAR does not include all those who are married, but only those who are 
currently living with a spouse. An example of a person belonging to the group OTHR is 
someone living in a multiple family household. Persons who live in households where 
they have no parent-child relationship and are not married or cohabiting with any of the 
other members of the household also belong to this category. In addition, those who in 
the data were coded as children although they are 25 and older, coded as lone parent 
and aged 75 and over, and those aged under 70 who are living in institutions were 
assigned the household position OTHR.  
To compute the deterministic household forecast we use the macro simulation 
model and corresponding computer programme LIPRO. We will here give a rough 
sketch of the LIPRO model. For a detailed description of the model and the computer 
programme, see Van Imhoff and Keilman (1991).  
We start out with a jump-off population broken down by age, sex, and the seven 
household positions described above. This population is then projected forward five 
years at a time by exposing it to household transition rates, death rates, and emigration 
rates that are dependent on age, sex, and household position. The female part of the 
population in the age group 15-49 is also exposed to age and household-specific fertility 
rates. International migration is included in the model as emigration rates and 
immigration numbers broken down by age, sex, and household position.  
The population at time t+1 can then be calculated using the standard demographic 
bookkeeping equation.  
 
୲ାଵൌ୲୲൅୲୲ 
 
where ୲ is a column vector of the population broken down by age, sex, and household 
position at time t. ୲ is a column vector of immigrants who have arrived between time t 
and time t+1. 
୲and ୲are square matrices containing transition probabilities determined by the 
rate matrix ୲which contains age, sex, and household position-specific rates. 
The period (t, t+1) is five years.  
We have applied the exponential version of the model in which intensities are 
assumed to be constant within the unit time interval. Under this assumption the 
transition probability matrix Pt equals exp(5Mt). Transition probabilities for immigrants 
are given by  
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୲ൌሺ୲ ͷሻΤ Ǧଵ ൣ ሺͷ୲ሻ Ǧ൧, 
 
where I is the identity matrix. For small values of the rate matrix Mt the latter 
expression implies that immigrants are exposed to the risks of household events during 
approximately half the length of the unit time interval, i.e., approximately 2.5 years. 
The model is a first-order discrete time Markov model. Hence, once the immigrants 
have entered the country, they are subject to the same transition rates for household 
events, fertility, mortality, and emigration as the population present at the beginning of 
the time interval. For more details about the model and its derivation see Van Imhoff 
and Keilman (1991). 
As discussed above, the LIPRO model is based on the projection of individuals, 
not households. This means that, for example, the number of women who marry during 
a period will not in general be the same as the number of men who marry during the 
same period according to the model. To solve this problem LIPRO employs a 
consistency algorithm. For a thorough discussion of this algorithm see Van Imhoff 
(1992). In this case the consistency algorithm contains equations that require that equal 
numbers of men and women marry or enter cohabiting unions in each projection 
interval. The same applies to the number of men and women experiencing the 
dissolution of marital and cohabiting unions. We here employ the harmonic mean 
version of the consistency algorithm. This means that when there is a discrepancy 
between the modelled number of men and of women experiencing one of these events, 
the number is adjusted to the harmonic mean of the modelled number of men and the 
modelled number of women experiencing this event.  
The consistency algorithm described above assumes that each new couple consists 
of one male and one female partner. In reality same sex partnerships are observed as 
well in the two countries. In Denmark in the years 1999–2011 between 300 and 400 
same-sex couples married each year compared to 30,000 to 40,000 marriages of 
partners of opposite sex. In 2012 there were 4000 married same–sex couples in 
Denmark compared to more than one million married couples with partners of opposite 
sex. In Finland 0.2% of households are made up of same-sex married couples. Because 
same-sex couples make up such a small percentage and because statistics on same-sex 
cohabiters are not available (as they are difficult to distinguish from friends living 
together), we have chosen not to include them in this forecast.  
In addition to requirements for union formation and dissolution we have also 
constrained the capacity of institutions to be constant over time. In practice this was 
achieved by making the number of persons leaving an institution equal to the number 
entering an institution in each projection period. As the number of places available in 
institutions is a result of policy decisions we do not find it reasonable to let the future 
number of people in institutions be determined purely by transition rates. In addition to 
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the kind of consistency requirements described thus far it is also possible to set the 
number of births, deaths, immigrations, and emigrations equal to numbers from an 
external source. In this case we have chosen to set the total number of these events in 
each projection interval equal to the numbers from Statistics Denmark’s population 
projection 2010 for Denmark, and Statistics Finland’s population projection for 2009 
for Finland. For the case of mortality this means that, although initially the death rates 
are held constant during the 30-year projection period, the consistency algorithm 
reduces them so as to result in the numbers of deaths from the official population 
forecast. This implies an increase in the life expectancy.  
 
 
3.3 Stochastic population forecast 
The population forecasts are updates of the results from the Uncertain Population of 
Europe (UPE) project. The aim of that project was to compute stochastic population 
forecasts for 18 European countries, including Denmark and Finland. For more 
information about the methodology and assumptions see Alho et al. (2006), Alders, 
Keilman, and Cruijsen (2007), Alho et al. (2008) and the website http://www.stat.fi/ 
tup/euupe/. 
We calculated the stochastic population forecast using the Program for Error 
Propagation (PEP) developed by Juha Alho. This programme takes as its inputs the 
jump-off population and predicted mortality rates and fertility rates (for women) as well 
as net migration, all by one-year age groups for all the forecast years. In addition one 
must specify uncertainty parameters for these rates and the rates’ co-variances across 
time, age, and between the sexes.4 The programme then draws sample values from a 
standard normal distribution, and transforms them to correlated errors. Adding these 
errors to the specified rates in the logarithmic scale creates a sample path for the vital 
rates. This sample path together with the jump-off population is then used to calculate a 
sample path for the future population, using a cohort component model. The process is 
repeated to create the number of desired sample paths for the population. 
We updated the results from the UPE project by changing the jump-off year to 
2007 for Denmark and 2009 for Finland, and using age-specific death rates, birth rates, 
and net migration numbers taken from Statistics Denmark’s population projection of 
2010 for Denmark and that of 2009 for Finland. The remaining assumptions, that is, the 
variances and co-variances for the mortality rates, fertility rates, and net migration, 
were kept unchanged. We simulated 3000 paths for the future population.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Fertility, mortality, and net migration are assumed to be independent of each other. 
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3.4 Analysis of time series data 
In order to assess the level of uncertainty in the household shares we modelled time 
series for the period 1988–2009 for Finland and 1982-2007 for Denmark. Following 
earlier work on Norwegian data (see Alho and Keilman, 2010), we have opted for a 
tree-like structure.  
This led us to model six types of fractions (all specific for age, sex, and time): 
(1) the total share of MAR and SIN0; 
(2) the relative share of MAR out of MAR and SIN0; 
(3) the relative share of COH out of the total share of COH, CHLD, SIN+, OTHR, 
and INST; 
(4) the relative share of CHLD out of the total share of CHLD, OTHR, SIN+, and 
INST; 
(5) the relative share of SIN+ out of the total share of SIN+, OTHR, and INST; 
(6) the total share of INST out of the total share of INST and OTHR. 
 
We number the household positions as CHLD j=1, SIN0 j=2, COH j=3, MAR j=4, 
SIN+ j=5, OTHR j=6, INST j=7. Write V(j, x, s, t) for the number of people in 
household position j=1,2, . . .  who are in age x=0,1, . . .  and sex s, at time t=0,1,2, . . . . 
Aggregating over position, we obtain the population W(x, s, t)=ΣjV(j, x, s, t) of age x 
and sex s at time t. The share of household position j is α(j, x, s, t)=V(j, x, s, t)/W(x, s, t) 
= αj(x, s, t). The six fractions defined above are restricted to the interval [0,1]. 
Therefore, we applied logit transformations to the above-mentioned fractions. 
Temporarily suppressing indices for age, sex, and time, this gives: 
 
ɌଵൌሺȽଶ൅Ƚସሻൌ ሺሺȽଶ൅Ƚସሻ ሺͳǦȽଶǦȽସሻΤ ሻ 
 
ɌଶൌሺȽସ ሺȽଶ൅ȽସሻΤ ሻൌ ሺȽସ ȽଶΤ ሻ 
 
ɌଷൌሺȽଷ ሺȽଵ൅Ƚଷ൅Ƚହ൅Ƚ଺൅Ƚ଻ሻΤ ሻൌ ሺȽଷ ሺȽଵ൅Ƚହ൅Ƚ଺൅Ƚ଻Τ ሻሻ 
 
ɌସൌሺȽଵ ሺȽଵ൅Ƚହ൅Ƚ଺൅Ƚ଻ሻΤ ሻൌ ሺȽଵ ሺȽହ൅Ƚ଺൅Ƚ଻ሻΤ ሻ 
 
ɌହൌሺȽହ ሺȽହ൅Ƚ଺൅Ƚ଻ሻΤ ሻൌ ሺȽହ ሺȽ଺൅Ƚ଻ሻΤ ሻ 
 
Ɍ଺ൌሺȽ଻ ሺȽ଺൅Ƚ଻ሻΤ ሻൌ ሺȽ଻ Ƚ଺Τ ሻ 
 
We now have, by construction, six statistically independent time series, all of them 
specific for age and sex.  
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We conducted tests to see whether there were signs of autocorrelation in the data. 
This was indeed the case for quite a few of the time series for the first three fractions in 
both countries, and also for fraction 5 in Denmark. Therefore we experimented with 
different versions of ARIMA models. All in all we detected autocorrelation in a little 
less than half the time series for both Finland and Denmark. In the majority of cases an 
ARIMA (1,1,0) model ߦ௞ሺݐሻ ൌ ܿ௞ ൅ ߦ௞ሺݐ െ ͳሻ ൅ ߮൫ߦ௞ሺݐ െ ͳሻ ൅ ߦ௞ሺݐ െ ʹሻ൯ ൅ ݁௞ሺݐሻ, 
where ܿ௞ is a constant and ݁௞ is an error term, gave a good fit, although in a few cases 
models including a moving average part fitted even better. 
For each of the time series we also estimated a random walk with a drift model 
(RWD model), ߦ௞ሺݐሻ ൌ ߦ௞ሺݐ െ ͳሻ ൅ ܦ௞ ൅ ݁௞ሺݐሻ where ܦ௞ is a deterministic drift and 
݁௞ is an error term. In the cases where autocorrelation had been detected we compared 
the residual standard deviations estimated from the RWD model and the ARIMA model 
that gave the best fit. Although the RWD model did overestimate the residual standard 
deviation compared to the more refined model, the differences between the two were 
generally small. Striving for parsimony, we therefore decided to employ the RWD 
model throughout. This means that for a few household positions and age groups our 
prediction intervals for the household shares are wider than strictly necessary. In this 
sense our assessment of uncertainty is a bit conservative.   
The resulting standard deviations are generally larger for the youngest and oldest 
age groups than for the middle aged. They are also generally smallest for the shares for 
fractions 1 and 2, although this is not always the case for young adults (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Residual standard deviation of random walk with drift. Finnish men. 
 
 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland. 
Note: The categories refer to the six fractions defined in Section 3.4. 
 
We estimated the correlation between the sexes to be 0.46 for Denmark and 0.53 
for Finland, assuming independence of age and household position. Based on the work 
on Norwegian data by Alho and Keilman (2010), we assumed an AR(1) model, 
݁௞ሺݔ ൅ ͳǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ ൌ ߚ݁௞ሺݔǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ ൅ ݑ௞ሺݔǡ ݏǡ ݐሻǡ ȁߚȁ ൏ ͳ, for the correlation across age 
groups, assuming independence of sex and household position. Here ݁ refers to the 
errors from the random walk with drift models; ݔ = age, ݏ =sex, ݐ =time, whereas k=1, 
…, 6 refers to the six fractions defined above. The first-order autocorrelation ߚ was 
therefore estimated as the empirical correlation between residuals Ƹ݁௞ሺݔ ൅ ͳǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ and 
Ƹ݁௞ሺݔǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ. The estimated median values for the correlations were 0.63 for Denmark and 
0.29 for Finland.  
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3.5 Simulation of household shares 
We took 3000 draws, from a t-distribution.5 We assumed that the errors Ƹ݁௞ሺݐሻ of RWD 
model for the fractions ߦ௞ሺݐሻ, k = 1,...6 have a normal distribution, with expected value 
zero, and standard deviation estimated from that model. The ͳ െ ߙ level prediction 
interval ሾܮሺ݄ሻǡ ܷሺ݄ሻሿ for ݁௞ሺܶ ൅ ݄ሻ is of the form 
 
݁௞ሺܶሻ ൅ ܦ෡௞Ǥ ݄ േ ݐ்ିଶሺͳ െ ͳ ʹൗ ߙሻߪො௞ඨ
݄ଶ
ܶ െ ͳ ൅ ݄ǡ 
 
where ܶ is the number of observations in the RWD model, ܦ෡௞is the estimated drift, 
ݐ்ିଶሺͳ െ ͳ ʹൗ ߙሻ is the (ͳ െ ͳ ʹൗ ߙ) quantile of a t-distribution with ܶ െ ʹ degrees of 
freedom, andߪො௞is the estimated residual standard deviation of the RWD model.  
The terms ݄ and ݄ଶ ሺܶ െ ͳΤ ሻ under the square root account for innovation variance 
and for estimation error in the drift, respectively, while the t-distribution accounts for 
estimation error in the innovation variance. 
Assuming standard deviation and correlation between the sexes and across age 
groups as estimated from the time series analysis, these are used to create correlated 
errors, for each sex and age group. These errors are then added to the point predictions 
from the deterministic household projection, which have been transformed into the 
same type of logit fractions as described in the previous section.  
We then transformed the predicted shares ߦ௞ in the logit scale back to shares ߙ௞ in 
the original scale, for each time t and both sexes, according to: 
 
ߙଶ ൌ ሺߦଵሻ ሾሺͳ ൅ ሺߦଵሻሻሺͳ ൅ ሺߦଶሻሻሿΤ  
 
ߙସ ൌ ߙଶሺߦଶሻ 
 
ߙଷ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙଶ െ ߙସሻሺߦଷሻ ሺͳ ൅ ሺߦଷሻሻΤ  
 
                                                          
5 The number 3000 for our household simulations was chosen for practical reasons only: the probabilistic 
population forecast contains 3000 sample paths, and each population sample path is to be combined with one 
sample path for the household shares. Our box plots in Section 5 do not show an unrealistic number of 
outliers, and we therefore see no reason to increase the number of draws. 3000 has shown to be sufficient, 
especially when considering 80% prediction intervals. For probabilistic population forecasts, 3000 
simulations are more or less standard for populations with sizes comparable to the Danish and Finnish (Alho 
et al. 2006, 2008). 
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ߙଵ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙଶ െ ߙଷ െ ߙସሻሺߦସሻ ሺͳ ൅ ሺߦସሻሻΤ  
 
ߙହ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙଵ െ ߙଶ െ ߙଷ െ ߙସሻሺߦହሻ ሺͳ ൅ ሺߦହሻሻΤ  
 
ߙ଻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙଵ െ ߙଶ െ ߙଷ െ ߙସ െ ߙହሻሺߦ଺ሻ ሺͳ ൅ ሺߦ଺ሻሻΤ  
 
ߙ଺ ൌ ͳ െ ߙଵ െ ߙଶ െ ߙଷ െ ߙସ െ ߙହ െ ߙ଻ 
 
This way we obtained 3000 sample paths for each of these shares, specific for age and 
sex. Finally, we multiplied each of these sample paths for the household shares with 
one of the simulations from the stochastic population forecast. This then results in 3000 
sample paths for the number of people in each household position.  
Implicit in this multiplication is the assumption that the household shares and the 
population numbers are independent random variables. This assumption is difficult to 
check empirically, but we have reasons to believe that it is a reasonable one. A possible 
dependence is that between the number of elderly persons (which is determined by 
mortality) and the share of one-person households in that age bracket. Often, when one 
of two partners in an elderly couple dies, the surviving partner becomes a one-person 
household. The implied correlation is likely small, because it refers to a second-order 
effect, namely the difference between mortality of men and women who live in a 
couple.   
Somewhat less straightforward is a possible link between the number of young 
children and household structure through fertility, as demonstrated by Jiang and O’Neill 
(2007). The impact on partnered households caused by fertility is not very big, given 
that COH and MAR represent households both with and without children. But our 
assumption on stochastic independence will have a small effect on the number of lone 
parents. Jiang and O’Neill find that increasing or decreasing TFR by 0.5 leads to a 
change in the number of single parents by 1% 30 years ahead. Because the effect is 
small we think it is reasonable to ignore the interdependence in this paper. 
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4. Data and assumptions 
As mentioned above, we have used data on the population broken down by five-year 
age group, sex, and household position from population registers compiled by Statistics 
Denmark and Statistics Finland for January 1st of the years 1987–2008 and 1982–2007, 
respectively6. 
We have also used data on transitions between household positions, broken down 
by sex and five-year age groups. These data show the number of persons who were in 
household position k (k=1,…,7) on 1 January of a certain year and in household 
position j (j=1,…7) on 1 January of the previous year.  In this case we had Finnish data 
for the period 2004–2008 and Danish data for the period 2002–2006. The household 
transition data were used to compute one-year transition probabilities. We decided to 
use averages over the period 2004–2008 for Finland and 2002–2006 for Denmark so as 
to avoid erratic patterns for infrequent transitions. The probabilities of entry into single 
fatherhood in Finland seemed too high, and were therefore set to 20% of the 
corresponding numbers for women (but this probability was set to zero for men aged 
10–14). The Finnish birth rate for single mothers in the age group 15–19 also seemed 
unrealistically high and was adjusted downwards to the Danish rate. In addition, for 
both countries the probabilities for entry to single parenthood after age 70 were set to 
zero, and those for going from single parent to other private households were set to 1. 
The same applies to dependent children after the age of 25.  
Numbers of deaths, emigrants, and immigrants decomposed by age, sex, and 
household position, as well as births broken down by age and household position of the 
mother, were available for the same years as the rest of the transition data in the Danish 
case, whereas in the Finnish case they were only available for the year 2008. To avoid 
irregular patterns in Finnish age-specific death probabilities, the married, cohabiting, 
and single parents were combined into one group, and those living alone and those 
living in other positions in private households were gathered into another group. 
Similarly, the married, cohabiting, and single parents were grouped together when 
computing emigration probabilities. 
Many of the age patterns for the transition probabilities are qualitatively the same 
for men and women and also between the two countries, although the magnitudes vary. 
As an example of the age patterns, Figures 2–5 show some of the one-year transition 
probabilities for Finnish women for the period 2004–20087.   
Among the general features observed for both sexes and in both countries are: 
                                                          
6 For more information on the Danish data see www.dst.dk/declarations/761. 
7 The age groups on the X-axis refer to age as of 1st January 2004.   
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- young people who live on their own are likely to enter into cohabitation 
(Figure 2); 
- those cohabiting in their 20s and 30s have high marriage probabilities 
(Figure 3);  
- living with a spouse is a stable position except at the end of the life 
course when experiencing the death of the spouse or entry into an 
institution is common (Figure 4);  
- for all age groups the cohabiting experience higher probabilities of 
switching to single household position than do those living with a spouse 
(Figures 3 and 4);  
- young single parents often start a cohabiting relationship (Figure 5). 
When they are in their fifties they have an elevated chance of living alone 
because their (last) child leaves the household; 
Figures 6 and 7 show the probabilities of entering and exiting an institution, 
respectively, for men and women in Finland. We see that the probability of entering an 
institution is highest for the cohabiting and lowest for married men and women, and for 
women living in other private households. The protective effect of marriage is in line 
with findings in earlier studies (e.g. Nihtilä and Martikainen 2008; Martikainen et al. 
2009). Earlier research has not, to our knowledge, included the cohabiting as a separate 
category; little is known about their excess risk of entering an institution for the elderly.  
The probability of leaving an institution is highest for those living alone and lowest for 
the cohabiting. A possible explanation is that persons who live with a partner receive 
more private care and hence tend to enter an institution later than those who live alone, 
other things being equal. This means that persons in an institution with a partner who 
lives elsewhere have more fragile health than persons who do not have a partner. In 
support of this idea, Martikainen et al. (2009) found that those living alone were in 
better health when moving to an institution than those living with a spouse or 
cohabiting.  
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Figure 2: One-year transition probabilities. Women who live alone, 2004-2008, 
Finland 
 
 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland. 
 
As described above, what we have computed from the transition data are transition 
probabilities. What we need as input to our household projection model are, however, 
occurrence-exposure rates. Under a constant intensity assumption, the probability 
matrix ௧ܲ is an exponential function of the rates matrix ܯ௧. Thus to find the occurrence-
exposure rates in Mt we need to compute the logarithm of ௧ܲ, defined as a power series. 
The power series, however, does not always converge: see Van Imhoff and Keilman 
(1991: 77) for details. Hence we assume that the occurrence-exposure rate for a certain 
household event is equal to the one-year transition probability for the corresponding 
change in household position. This introduces a small error in the rates. Under the 
assumption used, a Taylor series expansion shows that the probability matrix ܲ and the 
rate matrix ܯ are related as ܲ ൌ ܫ െ ܯ ൅ ͳ ʹൗ ܯଶ െ ͳ ͸ൗ ܯଷ ൅ ڮ, where ܫ is the 
identity matrix. Most rates are in the order of magnitude of a few per cent or less. 
Mortality at high ages is an exception, where rates up to 30% are found. Thus for 
mortality we computed rates from numbers of deaths and exposure times assuming that 
there are no disturbing events in the particular population group defined by age, sex, 
and household position.  
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Figure 3: One-year transition probabilities. Cohabiting women, 2004-2008, 
Finland 
 
 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland. 
 
 
Getting numbers for the institutional population in Denmark was difficult. A law 
was passed in 1987 which abolished the building of nursing homes from January 1st 
1988. The existing nursing homes were to be phased out gradually. These were then to 
be replaced by nursing apartments which offer the same level of care, but where the 
residents all have their own apartment with bathroom and a small kitchen. The nursing 
apartments are not considered institutions in the legal sense. Although residents of these 
apartments are needs tested they are considered tenants, which involve a different set of 
rights and responsibilities compared to persons who live in an institution. As the 
nursing apartments are not considered institutions, those living there are not registered 
as living in an institution in the household register. The way the residents are registered 
can vary between municipalities.  
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Figure 4: One-year transition probabilities. Married women, 2004-2008, 
Finland 
 
 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland. 
 
For those living in nursing homes we have detailed information about numbers and 
transitions, broken down by age and sex. The data we have about the population living 
in nursing apartments are the numbers in the age groups 67–74, 75–79, 84–89, and 90+. 
We assume that the distribution across age and sex is the same in the nursing apartment 
population as in the nursing home population, which numbered about 10,000 and 
30,000, respectively, in 2007. In order to get an estimate of the number of persons 
living in institutions in the jump-off population we therefore adjusted the distribution of 
residents in nursing apartments to fit into our age group classification and divided the 
residential population between the sexes using the age and sex distribution of the 
nursing home population in 2007. To accommodate the increase in the institutional 
population the numbers of elderly living alone were adjusted downwards. Although, as 
noted above, the registration of those living in nursing apartments varies between 
municipalities, we have reason to believe that the majority are registered as living 
alone. In the years when extra funding was given for the conversion and replacement of 
nursing homes we witness a steep decrease in the share living in nursing homes. This is 
mirrored by a sharp increase in the proportion living alone. The same is not the case for 
the share living with a partner. 
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Figure 5: One-year transition probabilities. Lone mothers, 2004–2008, Finland 
 
 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland. 
 
 
As the Danish transition rates into institutions only reflected those moving to 
nursing homes, we decided to use the transition rates into institutions from the Finnish 
data in the Danish forecast. 
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Figure 6: One-year transition probabilities. People entering an institution, 
2004–2008, Finland 
 
 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland. 
 
 
Figure 7: One-year transition probabilities. People leaving an institution,  
2004–2008, Finland 
 
 
Note: Different scale. 
Source: Own computations based on data supplied by Statistics Finland. 
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Multistate life tables based on the first projection interval, which is 2009–2013 and 
2007–2011 for Finland and Denmark, respectively, give a summary view of the input 
rates for this period (Tables 1 and 2). Table 1 shows that the Fins spend a little more 
than a quarter of their lives living as a child, a third living with a spouse, 11% 
cohabiting, and around 20% living alone. The Danes spend a somewhat larger fraction 
of their lives living as a child and a little less living with a spouse (Table 2). Based on 
this life table the average Fin is more likely to be married than the average Dane; cf. 
below. In both countries the majority of children are born to mothers who live with a 
spouse, although the difference between births by married and cohabiting women is 
smaller in Denmark than in Finland. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of lifetime spent in various household positions, and 
number of children by mother’s household position, Denmark  
2007–2011 
 CHLD SIN0 COH MAR SIN+ OTHR INST All (=100%) 
    %    years 
Men 29 19 11 31 1 8 0.3 75.1 
Women 26 21 11 30 5 6 0.7 79.9 
         
children 
 0.02 0.08 0.70 0.83 0.08 0.16 0.00 1.88 
 
The rates are held constant throughout the projection period, except for small 
changes due to consistency requirements; cf. Section 3.2. In Section 5.2 an alternative 
to holding the rates constant, based on trend extrapolation of the rates, will be discussed 
briefly.  
 
Table 2: Percentage of lifetime spent in various household positions, and 
number of children by mother’s household position, Finland  
2009–2013 
 CHLD SIN0 COH MAR SIN+ OTHR INST All (=100%) 
    %    years 
Men 26 20 11 35 1 6 1 74.8 
Women 22 22 11 34 4 5 1 82.3 
         
children 
 0.00 0.09 0.42 1.27 0.10 0.05 0.00 1.93 
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5. Results 
5.1 Main outcomes8 
The numbers of persons in each household position are obtained directly from 
multiplying the sample paths as described in Section 3.5. In addition we have computed 
sample paths for the number of private households of each type, as this is important for 
many planning purposes. The numbers of married and cohabiting households equal half 
the numbers of married and cohabiting persons. The number of other private 
households is estimated by dividing the population living in such households by 4.65, 
which was the mean size in Finland at the jump-off point. The same number was used 
for Denmark. Adding on the numbers of people living alone and single parents gives 
3000 paths for the number of private households. Mean household size is then 
computed as the size of the population in private households divided by the number of 
private households.   
Tables 3 and 4 show the expected development in the number of private 
households of each type, the lower and upper bounds of the 80% prediction intervals, as 
well as the coefficients of variation (CV) for Denmark and Finland, respectively.  
 
Table 3: Average value, coefficient of variation, and lower and upper bounds 
of 80% prediction intervals, for the number of private households,  
by household type. Denmark 
 Married couple One-person 
household 
Cohabiting 
Couple 
Lone parent 
household 
Other private 
household 
All private 
households 
2007       
Observed 990299 944405 283197 168944 91148 2477992 
2017       
Average 968171 1036930 302350 181323 86936 2575710 
CV (%) 3.3 4.9 8.9 21.3 12.5 1.8 
80% low 926441 972475 268641 135234 72368 2517057 
80% high 1009953 1103045 336773 234197 100781 2637122 
2027       
Average 962468 1167539 321254 177936 90419 2719616 
CV (%) 7.2 9.7 17.7 29.5 19.9 3.5 
80% low 873445 1025302 251565 115541 68362 2602674 
80% high 1051393 1314627 397698 249010 114750 2839892 
2037       
Average 957762 1244238 324567 179700 90555 2796823 
CV (%) 7.8 17.8 17.8 29.1 20.2 4.8 
80% low 862518 1084466 254229 117327 68352 2626514 
80% high 1052869 1413500 402241 250377 114791 2968712 
 
                                                          
8 Additional results are available from the webpage of the AGHON-project (http://aghon.etla.fi/) and from the 
first author upon request. 
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When we look at the growth in the numbers of private households of various types 
during the 30 year period, the strongest increase is expected in the number of one-
person households: 31% and 50% in Denmark and Finland, respectively. We also notice 
quite a large increase in the number of households consisting of a cohabiting couple. On 
the other hand, the number of “Other private household” in both countries and the 
number of married couple households in Denmark will decrease slightly.  Overall, we 
expect an increase in the number of Danish private households by 13%, from 2.5 to 2.8 
million. For Finland we expect a growth of 27%, from 2.5 to 3.1 million. Married 
couple households become less important, numerically speaking, falling from 40% to 
34% of all private households in Denmark and from 38% to 33% in Finland. The 
fraction of single person households, on the other hand, is expected to increase from 
38% to 44% in Denmark and from 41% to 49% in Finland. It is virtually impossible 
that there will be fewer private households by 2037/2039: looking at the 3000 draws, 
only 1% of the Danish and none of the Finnish imply a smaller number of households 
in the final year than in the initial year. The corresponding number for married couple 
households is a staggering 67% for Denmark but only 0.7% for Finland. The probability 
of a decrease in single person households is 2% in Denmark, whereas in Finland none 
of the draws imply a reduction. All in all we expect a decrease in the average household 
size from 2.16 to 2.13 (80% prediction interval 2.01–2.28) in Denmark and from 2.14 to 
1.89 (80% prediction interval 1.79–1.99) in Finland during the period.  
 
Table 4: Average value, coefficient of variation and lower and upper bounds 
of 80% prediction intervals, for the number of private households,  
by household type. Finland 
 Married couple One-person 
household 
Cohabiting 
Couple 
Lone parent 
household 
Other private 
household 
All private 
households 
2009       
Observed 924692 1014974 292381 127534 90830 2450410 
2019       
Average 1012967 1166789 321919 142903 70801 2715379 
CV (%) 1.9 3.0 4.9 8.2 6.5 1.1 
80% low 988438 1123281 301699 128596 64752 2677248 
80% high 1037475 1211384 342188 158311 76866 2753627 
2029       
Average 1037753 1279715 325467 141195 71540 2855671 
CV (%) 3.7 5.0 9.4 13.7 12.2 2.6 
80% low 988412 1197593 286651 117146 60886 2762293 
80% high 1087005 1359412 364671 166342 82429 2947925 
2039       
Average 1043100 1530345 330394 139418 74851 3118108 
CV (%) 4.8 5.8 10.2 14.3 12.9 4.1 
80% low 980039 1415572 288291 115461 63024 2953258 
80% high 1108612 1641940 373195 165715 87043 3278831 
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We see that there is largest relative uncertainty, as reflected in the CVs, concerning 
the household types “Other private household” and “Lone parents”. The number of 
married couple households is easier to predict, as judged by the CV. The Danish 
predictions are more uncertain than the Finnish numbers. This is due to two reasons. 1. 
The Danish RWD models show somewhat larger residual standard deviations than the 
Finnish models. 2. Danish population numbers are somewhat more uncertain, especially 
among the elderly. For instance, 30 years ahead the CV for Danish men aged 95–99 is 
0.83 compared to 0.62 for Finnish men. Likewise, for women the Danish CV is 0.61 
and the Finnish 0.49. Note that forecasts for the total number of private households are 
more certain (CV-values after 30 years of 4.8% and 4.1% for Denmark and Finland, 
respectively) than forecasts for each of the specific household types (CV-values ranging 
from 4.8% to 29.1%). This is due to aggregation: some of the specific household types 
move in opposite directions. Hence their sum is easier to predict than the elements. 
Note also that prediction uncertainty (still judged by the CV) increases more 
steeply during the first two decades than during the last decade of the forecast period. 
The reason that uncertainty stabilizes towards the end of the projection period is to be 
found in the transformation of the shares from the logit scale (with linearly increasing 
prediction intervals and unbounded predicted values) back to the original scale (with 
predicted values limited between zero and one). 
With a few exceptions9, the coefficients of variation in Tables 3 and 4 are smaller 
than corresponding CVs for Norway in the article by Alho and Keilman (2010). Thanks 
to the high quality register data we were able to fit more realistic times series models 
(RWD) than Alho and Keilman: due to the paucity of their data they estimated very 
simple Random Walk models. If the real process is random walk with drift, a random 
walk model will result in too large estimates of the residual standard deviation.  
While CVs reflect relative uncertainty, absolute uncertainty can be analysed by 
inspecting the width of the prediction intervals. The upper and lower bounds of the 80% 
prediction intervals in Tables 3 and 4 show that there is largest absolute uncertainty 
regarding the number of single person households in both Denmark and Finland. This 
reflects the fact that they are the most numerous household type. On the other hand, 
because of their small numbers, single parents have some of the smallest absolute 
uncertainties.  
Figures 8 and 9 show that predicted household trends are in line with two broad 
developments that have gone on for a few decades: among all private households 
married couple households have lost their dominant position, while one-person 
households have become much more important, numerically speaking. This 
development, which also is to be found in many other Western countries (e.g. 
                                                          
9 Exceptions are Danish results for lone parents in the first period of the forecast, lone parents, married and 
cohabiting couples in the second period, and single person households in the final period of the forecast. 
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Christiansen 2012), is caused by falling fertility and the increased popularity of 
consensual unions, combined with an increase in divorce. Since the late 1980s the 
shares of both cohabiting couple households and lone parent households have been 
remarkably stable. 
 
Figure 8: One-person households, cohabiting and married couple households, 
and lone parent households, as a share of all private households. 
Observed (1987, 1997, 2007) and average projected values  
(2017, 2027, 2037), Denmark 
 
 
Tables 5 and 6 contain the CVs for the number of people in different household 
positions for the age groups 20–24, 50–54, and 80–84, separately for each sex, for 
Denmark and Finland, respectively. The relative uncertainty is generally largest for the 
youngest age group. A notable exception is the group of young adults who live in 
consensual union, those in Denmark in particular. Although residual standard 
deviations for young adults are higher than those for middle-aged adults (cf. Figure 1 
for the example of Finnish men), the large numbers of cohabiting young adults reduce 
their relative uncertainty. For the youngest two age groups (20–24 and 50–54) the 
greatest relative uncertainty concerns single parents. For the oldest age group there is a 
large amount of uncertainty concerning the cohabiting, the number living in nursing 
homes, and the number living in other private households. For the youngest age group 
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there is generally least uncertainty regarding the number of cohabiting and those living 
alone, whereas for the middle aged and elderly the most certain are the married and 
those living alone. In general, when there are many persons in a particular household 
position, this category is easier to predict than a less numerous one.   
 
Figure 9: One-person households, cohabiting and married couple households, 
and lone parent households, as a share of all private households. 
Observed (1989, 1999, 2009) and average projected values  
(2019, 2029, 2039), Finland. 
 
 
  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
One person
households
Cohabiting
couple
households
Married couple
households
Lone parent
households
1989
1999
2009
2019
2029
2039
Demographic Research: Volume 28, Article 43 
http://www.demographic-research.org  1291 
Table 5: Coefficient of variation for the number of people in different 
household positions for selected age groups, by sex. Denmark 
 20-24 years 50-54 years 80-84 years 
Men 2017 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.390 
0.104 
0.113 
1.890 
0.386 
- 
 
0.045 
0.084 
0.179 
0.290 
0.183 
- 
 
0.065 
0.080 
0.320 
- 
0.530 
0.345 
Men 2027 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.755 
0.261 
0.198 
1.963 
0.490 
- 
 
0.098 
0.136 
0.415 
0.524 
0.407 
- 
 
0.142 
0.171 
0.618 
- 
0.865 
0.750 
Men 2037 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.762 
0.273 
0.212 
1.969 
0.499 
- 
 
0.110 
0.142 
0.417 
0.525 
0.405 
- 
 
0.177 
0.192 
0.596 
- 
0.840 
0.822 
Women2017 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.349 
0.115 
0.093 
1.170 
0.626 
- 
 
0.042 
0.091 
0.190 
0.202 
0.237 
- 
 
0.079 
0.050 
0.346 
- 
0.541 
0.322 
Women 2027 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.655 
0.275 
0.166 
1.230 
0.686 
- 
 
0.098 
0.145 
0.432 
0.414 
0.447 
- 
 
0.175 
0.110 
0.710 
- 
0.876 
0.680 
Women 2037 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.660 
0.287 
0.181 
1.124 
0.697 
- 
 
0.105 
0.150 
0.431 
0.416 
0.448 
 
0.196 
0.138 
0.682 
- 
0.839 
0.744 
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Table 6: CVs for the number of people in different household positions for 
selected age groups, by sex. Finland 
 20-24 years 50-54 years 80-84 years 
Men 2019 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.262 
0.142 
0.149 
- 
0.214 
 
0.033 
0.050 
0.104 
0.160 
0.123 
- 
 
0.051 
0.072 
0.582 
- 
0.323 
0.365 
Men 2029 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.432 
0.246 
0.281 
- 
0.364 
 
0.066 
0.086 
0.235 
0.398 
0.288 
- 
 
0.123 
0.157 
0.829 
- 
0.618 
0.783 
Men 2039 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.439 
0.254 
0.290 
- 
0.367 
- 
 
0.075 
0.093 
0.240 
0.400 
0.289 
- 
 
0.155 
0.169 
0.780 
- 
0.634 
0.866 
Women 2019 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.244 
0.177 
0.118 
0.710 
0.377 
- 
 
0.034 
0.055 
0.112 
0.121 
0.135 
- 
 
0.068 
0.044 
0.715 
- 
0.297 
0.306 
Women 2029 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.357 
0.306 
0.219 
0.817 
0.493 
- 
 
0.071 
0.095 
0.249 
0.285 
0.332 
- 
 
0.158 
0.094 
1.060 
- 
0.544 
0.664 
Women 2039 
MAR 
SIN0 
COH 
SIN+ 
OTHR 
INST 
 
0.360 
0.332 
0.228 
0.821 
0.499 
- 
 
0.077 
0.080 
0.253 
0.287 
0.335 
- 
 
0.166 
0.170 
0.989 
- 
0.550 
0.726 
 
The box-and-whisker plots in Figures 10 and 11 display the shares in the 
household types married, cohabiting, and single person households in the age groups 
20–24, 50–54, and 80–84, for Denmark in 2037 and Finland in 2039, respectively. 
These plots give the usual first and third quantiles as well the median, and outliers 
among the 3000 sample paths.  
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Figure 10: Box and whisker plots of the shares living in the household positions 
married, cohabiting, and living alone, men and women in selected age 
groups in 2037. Denmark 
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Figure 11: Box and whisker plots of the shares living in the household positions 
married, cohabiting, and living alone, men and women in selected age 
groups in 2039. Finland 
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5.2 Changing rates 
As mentioned in Section 4, the input rates for the deterministic household forecast are 
held constant throughout the projection period, except for adjustments to satisfy internal 
and external consistency requirements.  We tried to improve on this approach detecting 
a possible time trend in the rates. We assumed a linear trend in (the logit of) the rates 
and extrapolated these rates linearly. This meant that there were varying rates for each 
five-year period of the projection. Using these types of rates did, however, in some 
cases lead to implausible results. An example is the share of cohabiting among young 
(20–35) women in Denmark. Using varying rates led to a sharp increase in the share of 
these women from 2009 to 2019. The share then fell quite significantly from 2019 to 
2029, and thereafter increased to about the same level as in 2019. In our opinion these 
results were implausible. For the majority of other household positions using varying 
rates did not have much effect on the results, and we therefore decided to stick to 
constant rates throughout the projection period. Loosely speaking, when rates are 
constant over time, this corresponds to shares that have constant (upward or downward) 
slopes.  
 
 
5.3 RWD extrapolations  
We also experimented with expected values for the shares computed from direct 
extrapolations of the random walk with drift models (transformed back from the logit 
scale to the original scale). This was done in order to directly take account of the trends 
in the shares. This approach did, however, in some cases lead to implausible results. For 
example, it gave results for Finland in 2037 where only around 60% in the age group 
15–19 lived with their parents, and hardly any in the age group 20–24. In Denmark it all 
but extinguished the share of elderly living in other private households. Compared to 
the LIPRO findings, the results from this method suggest a much stronger substitution 
of marriage for cohabitation for the young and middle aged. An additional 
methodological drawback of this approach is that we cannot take advantage of the 
internal and external consistency requirements built into the LIPRO model.   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Given the need for planning based on household structure, spanning from public 
income and expenditure to the demand for consumer durables, this article has 
investigated the future household structure in Denmark and Finland with a 30-year 
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horizon. Predictive distributions have been computed for households of several types 
and for persons in various household positions, including the institutionalized. We have 
used the random share approach developed by Alho and Keilman (2010), and tried to 
improve on their results by taking advantage of high quality data from Danish and 
Finnish population and housing registers. As was done in their article, we combined a 
probabilistic forecast for the share of people in each household position, broken down 
by age and sex, with simulations from a stochastic population forecast covering the 
same period. This then gives a probabilistic household forecast for the number of 
people in each household position.  
Our results show an expected further increase in the number of private households, 
from 2.5 to 2.8 million (80% prediction interval 2.6–3.0 million) in Denmark and from 
2.5 to 3.1 million (80% prediction interval 3.0–3.3 million) in Finland. Taken together 
with an increase in population size, this means a decrease in the mean household size 
from 2.16 to 2.13 persons per private household in Denmark and from 2.14 to 1.89 p/ph 
in Finland. We find a further reduction in the share of married couple households and a 
growing importance of one-person households. The largest coefficients of variation are 
for lone parent households and “other private household”, and smallest for married 
couple households. The single person household, on the other hand, displays the largest 
absolute uncertainty, reflecting the fact they are the most numerous household type.  
How should users handle a specific forecast result in the form of a probability 
distribution, rather than one number? In the short term, up to five years, say, forecast 
uncertainty is not important. In the longer run, however, users should be aware of the 
costs attached to employing a forecast result that subsequently turns out to be too high 
or too low (“loss function”). Also, users should ask themselves whether an immediate 
decision based on the uncertain forecast is necessary, or whether they can wait for a 
while until a new forecast possibly shows less uncertainty. If an immediate decision is 
required they should try to determine the most essential features of the loss function, 
and base their decisions on that. For instance, will an overprediction imply the same 
loss as an underprediction of the same magnitude? If not, a number higher or lower than 
the median or the mean of the predictive distribution will be the optimal choice.  
In his British Academy Annual Lecture on 1 December 2004, the Bank of England 
Governor Mervyn King stressed that in a wide range of collective decisions it is vital to 
think in terms of probabilities (King 2004). We must accept the need to analyse the 
uncertainty that inevitably surrounds these decisions. In order to frame a public 
discussion in terms of risk, the public needs to receive accurate and objective 
information about the risks. Transparency and honesty about risks should be an 
essential part of both the decision-making process and the explanation of decisions. If 
demographic projections are to inform policy decisions then the uncertainty of these 
projections must be assessed. In some areas greater uncertainty might lead to 
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postponement of action. In other policy arenas greater uncertainty might indicate that 
the best polices would be those most easily changed as the future unfolds. For example, 
a planner of public care facilities facing uncertain projections of the number of elderly 
who need institutional care might decide to rent additional capacity rather than building 
or buying a new institution. Explicitly estimating the degree of uncertainty in 
demographic projections encourages consideration of alternative population futures and 
the full range of implications suggested by these alternatives (Lee and Tuljapurkar 
2007). 
The fact that we could use register data had several advantages, compared to the 
data of Alho and Keilman (2010). First, we could estimate all the transition 
probabilities without making approximations from data based on marital status and 
small sample surveys. Hence we obtained reliable rate estimates even for household 
events that occur quite seldom. Second, using register data implies that the same 
definitions (of households, families, etc.) have been used throughout. Third, the data, 
spanning more than 20 years in both countries, could be used to construct time series 
models of household shares. We could then analyse the empirical prediction errors in 
these time series models to derive estimates for the uncertainty in the predicted 
household shares. This is a clear improvement on the Alho and Keilman (2010) 
approach where the “uncertainty parameters were estimated from observed errors of an 
old household forecast against subsequent censuses”. The better data is reflected in the 
fact that, when it comes to household numbers, compared to the Norwegian results the 
vast majority of the coefficients of variation are smaller, given household position and 
number of years into the forecast.  
Thus an important new insight based on our analysis is that households become 
easier to predict when household data from administrative registers are available for at 
least two decades. One may wonder why there are so few examples of household 
forecasts (not necessarily probabilistic) based on register data. To our knowledge there 
are few countries that have household register data reliable enough to employ them as a 
basis for household projection. Denmark and Finland have the longest running registers 
in Scandinavia. Norway and Sweden set up their household registers just a few years 
ago. In addition the Netherlands have a register running back to the mid-1990s. Other 
countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain) maintain registers, but the household data are not 
generally available for research purposes, as far as we know. A number of Asian 
countries have family registers that keep track of blood relations. To use survey data as 
a basis for household projection has a long history, e.g., see Van Imhoff et al. (1995) 
and the references therein. Variances and covariances necessary to construct an 
empirically based probabilistic household forecast may be estimated from the errors of 
an old household forecast, as exemplified by Alho and Keilman (2010) for the case of 
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Norway. But reliable estimates of such uncertainty measures require richer data than 
these authors disposed of. 
Finally we want to stress a more general point. There are many reasons why 
administrative registers should get more emphasis in data collection for statistical 
purposes. An important one is that a traditional population census, based on 
questionnaires to be filled out by individuals, has become extremely costly to 
undertake. As an alternative many countries consider a change away from a traditional 
census to a register-based census. Countries such as Denmark, Finland, Norway, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden have shown how those registers can be used. The registers of 
Finland and the Netherlands have excellent household information, the quality of 
household data from Danish register is good (information on elderly institutions is not 
reliable), while Norwegian household data are problematic, due to problems in the 
dwelling register in that country. Statistical agencies should prioritize improving the 
quality of existing registers, and developing administrative registers in countries where 
they do not yet exist. 
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Abstract 
Background: This study explores the relationship between children’s sex composition and 
parents’ mortality in a contemporary western society. It improves on earlier research by using 
a larger and more representative dataset – constructed from registers and encompassing the 
entire Norwegian population.  Methods: The analysis is based on discrete-time hazard models, 
estimated for the years 1980-2008 for women and men born after 1935. Results: When 
operationalising sex composition as the “number of boys”, coefficients are insignificant in all 
specifications. However, when considering the three categories “only boys”, “only girls” and 
“mixed sex”, I find a small but significant disadvantage of having only girls, compared to 
having at least one of each sex, for mothers of two or more children. Having only daughters is 
associated with a mortality disadvantage compared to having only sons for mothers of two 
children, but a mortality advantage among mothers with four children. Among women who 
gave birth to their first child as teenagers, those who have only sons have relatively high 
mortality.  I also find an excess mortality both for mothers of only girls and mothers of only 
boys in the period 1980-1989.  Conclusion: These results lend some support to the notion that 
there is a larger benefit of the first son or daughter than the later children of the same sex, and 
especially in the earliest decade of the study period. 
 
 
Keywords: Mortality, children’s sex composition, register data, Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Many earlier studies have shown a relationship between an individual’s mortality and the 
number of children he or she has. Generally, the childless have higher mortality than those 
with children, and those with only one child have higher mortality than those with two. Some 
authors have also reported an increasing mortality as the number of children exceeds four or 
five [1,2,3], while other studies, including one from Norway [4], have shown no such 
disadvantage at high parities.  These relationships have been thought to reflect physiological 
effects of pregnancies (for women) as well as various types of social effects of having 
children. For example, children may be a source of emotional satisfaction, and above a certain 
age they may exert control on parents’ behaviour and provide care and assistance, which may 
reduce mortality. On the other hand, parenthood may also lead to stress because of economic 
worries or concerns about the children’s wellbeing. Moreover, there are selective influences: 
several factors of importance for fertility also affect later health and mortality through other 
channels.  The social effects of parenthood probably vary with the characteristics of the 
children, such as their personality, education, economic resources, health, and family situation. 
The children’s sex may also have some importance as a conditioning factor.  
Few studies have addressed the effect of children’s sex composition on parents’ mortality, and 
most of them have considered pre-industrial populations. Using data on Sami women from 
northern Scandinavia, Helle, Lummaa and Jokela [5] found that having sons increases a 
woman’s mortality, whereas having daughters has the opposite effect. However, later studies 
have failed to consistently replicate these results and have usually found identical, or almost 
identical, effects of sons and daughters on women’s mortality [e.g. 6,7,8,9].  There has been 
little research into whether the sex composition of the children affects parents’ mortality in 
western contemporary societies. A study by Jasienska, Nenko and Jasienski [10] concluded 
that daughters reduce men’s mortality whereas both sons and daughters increase women’s 
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mortality, and do so to the same extent. However, this investigation included only 102 women 
and 163 men born between 1894 and 1937.  It also only included people who had already died 
at the time of study and had at least one son and one daughter, and excluded those who were 
single or remarried. Studies based on larger and more representative samples are lacking.  
One could argue that there might be diminishing marginal returns to having children of a 
single sex. For example, even if having one son might benefit the parents and their health, 
having a second or third son might be less important. Perhaps they would be better off having 
at least one daughter, who might give them other benefits. In fact, many parents seem to have 
a preference for mixed-sex offspring. An indication of such sex preferences, is that in the 
Scandinavian countries there is no effect of the sex of the first born on the probability of 
having a second child and subsequent fertility is slightly higher among those who have two 
children of the same sex than those who have one boy and one girl. However, a slightly 
stronger preference for daughters seems to have developed over the last two decades [11]. 
This means that Scandinavians still prefer to have at least one child of each sex but now 
consider it to be more important to have at least one girl than at least one boy. The purpose of 
this study is to explore the relationship between children’s sex composition and parents’ 
mortality in a Nordic setting.   
The analysis is based on discrete-time hazard models, estimated for the years 1980-2008 for 
women and men born after 1935 using register data that encompasses the entire Norwegian 
population. As suggested by earlier studies [10], the effect of a certain sex composition is not 
necessarily the same for mothers and fathers, so the models are estimated separately for 
women and men. Furthermore, the effect may vary with certain characteristics of the parents. 
For example, among those who have support from a spouse, the practical assistance that 
daughters have often provided may be less crucial. In this study, the conditioning effects of 
age, education, marital status, age at first birth and period are considered.  
5 
 
Little attention has been devoted to the conceivable underlying mechanisms in the few earlier 
studies that have addressed the link between children’s sex and parents’ mortality. This paper 
therefore includes a quite thorough discussion of potential causal effects and selective 
influences, as well as the variations in these (section 2).  
 
2. Background 
Parenthood influences the well-being2 and lifestyle as well as economic decisions of the 
parents. Some of these influences may be contingent on the sex of the child.  
A few studies have looked into how the gender composition of children affects lifestyle 
choices. They have found that having an additional daughter reduces the probability of having 
an alcohol or drug problem, or smoking [12], and that mothers of first-born daughters weigh 
less than mothers of first-borns sons. However, fathers whose first-born was a daughter weigh 
more than a father who’s first-born was a son [13].  
It can also be hypothesised that it is more stressful to bring up boys. They are more likely to 
be hyperactive or diagnosed with attention deficit disorder or autism. More importantly, even 
boys without any disorders are often seen as more boisterous, noisy and less well behaved 
than girls.  At later ages boys have in recent decades been more likely to drop out of school 
and be unemployed, which may worry the parents. Moreover, bringing up sons may entail a 
higher level of economic stress. Studies have found that boys receive more pocket money than 
girls and that boys consumption is considered more important by parents [16,17]. A survey by 
a British bank [18] showed that boys cost on average 23% more to raise than girls.  
                                                          
2 A project with the aim of developing measures better reflecting general well-being is being undertaken by 
Eurostat and the OECD, albeit at a country level.  See for example  [14,15].  
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A US study [19] reported that the birth of a son induces a man to increase the number of hours 
worked more than does the birth of a daughter. Similarly, research employing German data 
finds that having a first-born son increases fathers’ working hours compared to having a first-
born daughter [20]. Moreover, both these studies find that fathers of boys have a higher wage 
rate than fathers of daughters, so the income advantage of the former is even larger than 
suggested by difference in working hours. Although fathers of sons work longer hours, there 
is no evidence that this happens at the expense of time spent with their children. On the 
contrary, fathers have been found to spend more time with their children – also with their 
daughters – when they have at least one son, and more time with their sons than with their 
daughters [21,22,23].  Even in a gender equal society like Sweden, fathers take out more 
parental leave following the birth of a son [24].  
A much cited study using US data found that having sons reduces the risk of divorce [25]. 
Later research has, however, failed to consistently replicate this result.  For example, a study 
employing data from 18 countries [26] reveals no difference between one-child couples with a 
son and one-child couples with a daughter. They do however find that two-child couples with 
children of the same sex, whether girls or boys, have higher divorce risks than those with one 
child of each sex, and that sons slightly lower divorce risks in three children families. A 
Swedish study reports the lowest divorce risk in mixed-sex two-child families, whereas the 
divorce risk at parity three rises with increasing number of girls [27].  
Old people tend to have more social contact with daughters than sons [28,29] and daughters 
are more likely than sons to provide care to their elderly parents. However, some studies 
report that the elderly receive more help from a child of the same sex, and that the reason why 
women are overrepresented as caregivers is that there are more women than men among the 
elderly due to men’s higher mortality [30].  
7 
 
All of the effects mentioned above probably have implications for the health of the parents 
and ultimately their mortality. For example, a higher weight (possibly linked to having sons, 
for mothers) is a risk factor for several potentially fatal diseases.  Working long hours, such as 
fathers of sons are more inclined to do, may affect health adversely. It has been shown to 
increase the risk of coronary heart disease and depression [31,32,33].  Furthermore, men’s 
possibly stronger involvement in their children if there is a boy in the family may be 
beneficial for the fathers, as well as for the mothers, in the long run. Even more importantly, 
divorce – which may also be linked to children’s sex – is strongly associated with mortality 
(e.g. [34]). Finally, the amount of social support, which daughters are particularly likely to 
supply to their ageing parents, may affect mortality [35].  Studies based on measurements of 
subjective health have yet to provide a clear picture. Powdthavee, Wu and Oswald [12] 
conclude that having an additional daughter induces people to report better subjective health, 
whereas (in a Middle East setting) Engelman, Agree, Yount and Bishai [36] find a negative 
association between the number of daughters and reported physical functioning, especially for 
men. 
A few studies have looked at the effect of children’s sex on parents’ well-being. One 
investigation employing Danish data reports a positive effect on fathers’ well-being if the 
first-born was a boy [37]. Another study finds that mothers of only sons are the happiest, and 
that those with a majority of boys display higher levels of happiness than those with other sex 
compositions of children [38]. Yet another study reports that fathers of boys are more likely to 
be happily married [39], which in turn heightens the protective effect of marriage (e.g. 
[40,41,42].  
In addition to all of these social effects of having children of a given sex, there are 
physiological implications for the mother of giving birth to sons. Male foetuses have higher 
intrauterine growth rates and birth weights and therefore require more maternal energy 
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[43,44,45,46]; and women carrying male foetuses experience higher levels of testosterone, 
which is an immunosuppressant [47,48]. 
 
Possible variations in the importance of children’s sex 
The potential effect of a given sex composition may be conditional on a variety of other 
factors. I consider these possible conditioning effects by stratifying according to a few 
characteristics (of the parent): age, period, marital status, education and age at first birth.  
The importance of children as caregivers increases with parents’ age, and having at least one 
daughter may therefore become increasingly advantageous with age. The same is true of the 
role of a daughter as a source of social contact.  
Besides age, marital status may also have an effect on the need for social contact with and 
help from the children, often daughters, as having a spouse can be a substitute when it comes 
to practical help and companionship. A wife or husband can also make the partner adopt a 
healthier lifestyle (e.g. cut down on smoking and drinking) in the same way as children, 
especially daughters often do.  
Education is another possible conditioning factor.  The more highly educated have a healthier 
lifestyle, which means that any pressure concerning life-style changes by children, and 
especially daughters, will be less important. However, one study [49] found that the highly 
educated women have a higher preference for girls, which assuming they assess correctly how 
important a daughter is to them, may mean that having at least one daughter  is especially 
beneficial for this group.  
Having a child at an early age is detrimental to health later in life. The effect might be 
dependent on the sex of the child. Women who become mothers at a very early age, especially 
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teenage mothers, are less likely to be in a relationship with the child’s father or have contact 
with the father at all. They are also likely to take less education [50]. Having had sons may 
have been particularly stressful for these women, as sons often require more attention than 
daughters and are more costly.    
Finally, the effect of having a certain sex composition may vary over time. For example, a 
relevant point might be that sons tended to be more highly educated than daughters a few 
decades ago. The education of the children has in some studies been shown to have a 
protective effect on parents’ mortality [51,52,53].  The differences between the sexes in these 
respects are now much smaller.  
 
3. Data and model 
The study includes all men and women born 1935-1968 who lived in Norway some time 
between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2008 and while they had at least one child. The 
data come from the Norwegian Central Population Register3, which includes every person 
resident in Norway for some time after 1960, each of whom has been assigned a unique 
identification number (at birth or at the time of immigration). The identification number is 
used in all kinds of contact with the authorities such as applying for education, paying tax or 
registering at a new address, thus allowing individual-level data from different registers to be 
linked. In this study, information on education has been added from the National Education 
Database operated by Statistics Norway, which includes the highest achieved educational 
                                                          
3 The data were used with the permission of Statistics Norway. 
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degree based on censuses prior to 1980 and on schools’ reporting thereafter.  The available 
data file reports year of death4 (taken from the exact dates in the primary data).  
In the Norwegian Central Population Register, parents’ identification numbers are included 
for all children who were born in Norway after 1964, or if born earlier, lived at home 
according to the 1970 census. Thus, almost complete birth histories can be established for all 
men and women in the country born after 1935. Unfortunately, given the available data it is 
not possible to distinguish between biological and adopted children. However the proportion 
of children who have been adopted is less than 1%.  
 
Discrete-time hazard regression models are estimated, separately for women and men using 
the Proc Logistic procedure in SAS version 9.3 [54]. I start by considering a model with the 
number of sons as the independent variable before considering models which compare having 
at least one child of each sex to those who have only children of one sex. 
 
For each individual, a series of one-year observations was created, starting in January 1980 or 
in January of the year he or she turned 40 (if born 1940 or later) or immigrated, and ending 
with the year of death, emigration, or in 2008, whichever came first. Each one-year 
observation includes an outcome variable, which is whether the person died within that year 
or not, and several independent variables characterising the situation at the beginning of the 
year: age, calendar year, educational level, marital status, number of children, and age at first 
birth. Those who did not have any children at the beginning of the year were excluded.   
                                                          
4 By law all deaths must be reported to the authorities based on a doctor's death certificate and will automatically 
be registered in official statistics. 
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Mathematically the model is log (1/(1-p)) = bX where p is the probability of dying, X is a 
vector of covariates and b are the estimates. Since death probabilities are low (1/(1-p)) ≈ p. 
An estimate b can therefore be interpreted as p being b times what it is in the reference 
category.    
Among men there were 54 073 deaths during the 12,816,408 person-years of follow-up, while 
there were 36 325 deaths during the 13,316,760 person-years for women. 
Five categories of education are distinguished: compulsory education (10 years of schooling 
according to the current school system); some secondary education (11-12 years); completed 
secondary education (13 years); some higher education (14-17 years); and master’s degree or 
higher (18+ years). When it comes to marital status the categories are: married, divorced, 
widowed and never married. Using Norwegian register data it is unfortunately not possible to 
distinguish those living in cohabiting relationships. Age at first birth is divided into the 
following groups: below 19, 20-22, 23-25, 26-29, 30-34 and above 35 years of age. 
 
The educational level is included in the models because it is an important determinant of 
fertility as well as mortality (e.g.  [55,56]). For the same reasons, calendar year and age are 
taken into account. Furthermore, age at first birth is controlled for, as giving birth at a very 
young age is associated with higher mortality [1,57,3] and tends to increase or be positively 
associated with completed fertility. Marital status affects mortality and is closely linked to 
reproductive behaviour, though without a clear one-way causality. For example, being 
unmarried obviously reduces fertility, while the number of children, and perhaps even their 
sex, are likely to have implications for marital status, which is therefore included in some, but 
not all, models. 
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Finally, the association between children’s sex and parents’ mortality may vary with the 
parent’s age, period, age at first birth marital status and education. I assess this by estimating 
the model separately for different categories of these variables.  
 
The exposure time and number of deaths in various categories of age, period, education, 
marital status, number of children and age at first birth are shown in table 1.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (CDR- crude death rate) 
 Men  Women  
 Exposure 
time 
Number of 
deaths 
CDR 
(per 
1000) 
Exposure 
time 
Number of 
deaths 
CDR 
(per 
thousand) 
Education       
Compulsory 
education 3,094,623 19,618 6.34 3,970,690 15,929 4.01 
Some secondary 
education 3,226,322 15,376 4.77 4,519,491 12,867 2.85 
Completed 
secondary 
education 
2,771,992 9,490 3.42 1,706,506 2,553 1.50 
Some higher 
education 2,582,601 7,073 2.74 2,763,219 4,494 1.63 
Master’s degree 
or higher 1,140,870 2,516 2.21 356,854 482 1.35 
       
Marital status       
Married 9,957,835 34,347 3.45 9,813,708 22,275 2.27 
Never married 666,561 2,342 3.51 581,631 1,294 2.22 
Widowed 157,845 1,805 11.43 621,147 3,984 6.41 
Divorced 2,034,167 15,579 7.66 2,300,274 8,808 3.83 
       
Number of 
children   
    
1 1,831,685 9,196 5.02 1,820,757 6,312 3.47 
2 5,664,702 21,463 3.79 5,828,087 14,430 2.48 
3 3,646,831 14,717 4.04 3,853,061 9,825 2.55 
4 1,196,454 5,917 4.95 1,295,294 3,909 3.02 
5 476,736 2,780 5.83 519,561 1,849 3.56 
       
Age at first birth       
Below 19 319,730 1,866 5.84 1,799,311 6,439 3.58 
20-22 2,021,660 10,716 5.30 3,927,521 11,868 3.02 
23-25 3,418,994 15,451 4.52 3,390,422 8,667 2.56 
26-29 3,799,934 14,775 3.89 2,600,871 5,919 2.28 
30-34 2,193,136 7,700 3.51 1,163,814 2,561 2.20 
Above 35 1,062,954 3,565 3.35 434,821 872 2.01 
       
       
Age       
40-49 6,733,908 13,236 1.97 6,971,375 8,755 1.26 
50-59 4,302,732 20,007 4.65 4,426,953 13,699 3.09 
60-73 1,779,768 20,830 11.70 1,918,432 13,871 7.23 
       
Period       
1980-89 2,059,959 5,608 2.72 2,123,594 3,299 1.55 
1990-99 4,575,997 16,628 3.63 4,719,398 10,878 2.30 
2000-08 6,180,452 31,837 5.15 6,473,768 22,148 3.42 
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4. Results 
In my first model, sex composition is operationalised as the number of boys. Table 2 displays 
the results of this regression without controlling for marital status, for men and women, 
respectively. I control for age, year, education, number of children and age at first birth. 
Neither for women nor for men is the effect of “Number of boys” statistically significant. The 
other effects are as expected: mortality is lower and fairly stable when the number of children 
exceeds one, lower among those who have a higher level of education, and lower for those 
(especially women) who had their first child later.  
Table 2 Relationship between number of boys and parental mortality controlling for parental 
demographics excluding marital status.  (Odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals)  
 Men Women 
   
Year 0.98   (0.97-0.98) 0.99   (0.99-0.99) 
Age 1.11   (1.11-1.11) 1.09   (1.09-1.10) 
   
Education   
Compulsory education 1 1 
Some secondary education 0.76   (0.74-0.78) 0.75   (0.73-0.77) 
Completed secondary education 0.65   (0.64-0.67) 0.50   (0.48-0.52) 
Some higher education 0.53   (0.52-0.55) 0.55   (0.53-0.57) 
Master’s degree or higher 0.42   (0.40-0.44) 0.47   (0.43-0.52) 
   
Number of children   
1 1 1 
2 0.69   (0.68-0.71) 0.69   (0.66-0.71) 
3 0.65   (0.63-0.67) 0.61   (0.59-0.64) 
4 0.67   (0.65-0.70) 0.60   (0.57-0.63) 
5 0.68   (0.64-0.71) 0.59   (0.56-0.63) 
   
Age at first birth   
Below 19 1.34   (1.27-1.40) 1.33   (1.29-1.38) 
20-22 1.19   (1.16-1.21) 1.10   (1.07-1.14) 
23-25 1 1 
26-29 0.91   (0.89-0.93) 0.97   (0.94-1.00) 
30-34 0.86   (0.84-0.88) 0.94   (0.90-0.99) 
Above 35 0.76   (0.73-0.79) 0.80   (0.74-0.86) 
   
Children’s sex composition   
Number of boys 1.00  (0.99-1.01) 1.00  (0.99-1.02) 
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Table 3 shows the estimates from models where marital status has been included. We see that 
the estimated coefficient for the variable “Number of boys” is hardly affected. The estimates 
for marital status are as seen in earlier studies: there is an advantage of being married 
compared to being single, whereas the never-married and the divorced are at a greater 
disadvantage than the widowed.  
Table 3 Relationship between number of boys and parental mortality controlling for parental 
demographics including marital status.  (Odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals)  
 Men Women 
   
Year 0.97   (0.966-0.97) 0.99   (0.99-0.99) 
Age 1.11    (1.11-1.12) 1.09   (1.09-1.10) 
   
Education   
Compulsory education 1 1 
Some secondary education 0.79   (0.78-0.81) 0.76    (0.75-0.78) 
Completed secondary education 0.69   (0.67-0.70) 0.49    (0.47-0.52) 
Some higher education 0.57   (0.55-0.58) 0.55    (0.53-0.57) 
Master’s degree or higher 0.46   (0.44-0.48) 0.46    (0.42-0.51) 
   
Marital status   
Married 1 1 
Never married 2.05   (1.95-2.14) 1.48    (1.40- 1.58) 
Widowed 1.65   (1.57-1.73) 1.38    (1.33-1.43) 
Divorced 2.16   (2.12-2.20) 1.63    (1.59-1.67) 
   
Number of children   
1 1 1 
2 0.78   (0.76-0.80) 0.75    (0.73-0.78) 
3 0.74   (0.72-0.76) 0.68    (0.66-0.71) 
4 0.76   (0.73-0.79) 0.67    (0.64-0.70) 
5 0.75   (0.71-0.79) 0.66    (0.64-0.70) 
   
Age at first birth   
Below 19 1.27   (1.13-1.34) 1.26    (1.22-1.31) 
20-22 1.15   (1.12-1.18) 1.08    (1.05-1.11) 
23-25 1 1 
26-29 0.92   (0.90-0.94) 0.98   (0.95-1.01) 
30-34 0.87   (0.85-0.90) 0.96   (0.92-1.01) 
Above 35 0.76   (0.73-0.79) 0.82   (0.99-0.88) 
   
Children’s sex composition   
Number of boys 0.99   (0.99-1.01) 1.00   (0.99-1.02) 
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I my second model, I replace the number of boys variable with an indicator variable denoting 
whether all the children are of the same sex. As this variable is always unity for one-child 
families, tables 4 and 5 show regression results only for those with two or more children. 
Controlling for age, period, education, marital status, number of children and age at first birth 
I find no significant effect of having only sons or only daughters rather than having at least 
one child of each sex for men (Table 4). For women, however, there is a statistically 
significant, though small, mortality disadvantage associated with having only daughters (3%). 
Very similar estimates are obtained when marital status is excluded from the models (not 
shown).  
Table 4 Effect of having children of only one sex compared to having at least one of each sex, for 
those with two or more children (Odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals) 
 Men Women 
Only boys 1.01  (0.99-1.04) 1.02  (0.99-1.05) 
Only girls  1.02  (0.99-1.05) 1.03  (1.00-1.07) 
   
Controlling for age, period, education, marital status, number of children and age at first birth.  
 
Using “having only sons” as the reference category instead of “having at least one of each sex”, 
in order to compare having only sons to having only daughters (and including parents with only one 
child) I find that mothers of two daughters have a significantly higher mortality than mothers of two 
sons (odds ratio 1.05; 95% confidence interval (1.00-1.10)). I also find that mothers of four daughters 
have a significantly lower mortality than mothers of four sons (odds ratio 0.82; 95% confidence 
interval (0.69-0.98)) (not shown in tables). 
When stratifying by level of education, marital status or age, I find no significant effects of 
children’s sex composition, neither when operationalised as number of boys, nor as only boys, 
only girls and mixed (results not shown). However, estimating the model separately for the 
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years 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2008 I find a disadvantage of having only children of a 
single sex on the longevity of women for the period 1980-1989 (Table 5).  
 
Table 5 Effect of having children of only one sex in the periods 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2008, 
for those with two or more children. (Odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals) 
 Men Women 
 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008 
Only boys 1.01 (0.93-
1.09) 
0.99 (0.99-
1.06) 
1.03 (0.99-
1.06) 
1.11 (1.00-
1.23) 
1.00 (0.95-
1.06) 
1.01 (0.97-
1.06) 
Only girls  0.99 (0.91-
1.07) 
1.02 (0.99-
1.06) 
1.03 (0.99-
1.06) 
1.15  (1.04-
1.24) 
1.00 (0.94-
1.06) 
1.03 (0.99-
1.08) 
       
 Controlling for age, period, education, marital status, number of children and age at first birth.  
 
The other statistically significant effect appears among women who gave birth to their first 
child as teenagers. In this group, I find a disadvantage of having only sons compared to at 
least one of each sex (odds ratio 1.10; 95% confidence interval 1.021-1.177).  
 
5. Discussion 
There is almost no knowledge available from contemporary western countries about whether 
the sex composition – in line with the preferences or not – affects the parents’ mortality.  Given 
the lack of earlier research, a study of the association between children’s sex composition and 
parents’ mortality based on high-quality data covering an entire national population should be 
a valuable contribution to the literature. Interestingly, when models are estimated for the 
period 1980-2008 and using the whole sample, there is only one significant effect: mothers 
who have only girls have a slightly higher (odds ratio 1.03 95% confidence interval (1.00-
1.07)) mortality than those who have at least one child of each sex. These results indicate 
(weakly) that there is a special value associated with sons. In other words, the benefits 
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supposed to be derived from having a daughter seem to be somewhat smaller than the positive 
effects of having a son, such as stronger involvement by the father, which probably also 
benefits the mother.  Such a marginally higher value of having a son would accord with the 
results from some studies of parents’ subjective well-being.  
Having only daughters compared to only sons is associated with a mortality disadvantage for 
mothers with two children, but an advantage for those with four children. The first result 
again points to a special importance of having sons. The second effect might reflect 
physiological effects of carrying many male foetuses or that having many sons is in some way 
burdensome.   
According to period-specific models, the high mortality among mothers with only girls was 
confined to the 1980s (odds ratio 1.11; 95% confidence interval (1.00-1.23)), when there was 
also a significant, but weaker, adverse effect of having only boys (odds ratio 1.15; 95% 
confidence interval (1.04-1.24)). This finding may reflect that sons and daughters at that time 
had more distinct roles, with sons for example being able to offer better advice as a result of 
having more education on average, while daughters to a larger extent contributed as 
caregivers, and as a consequence it was more important to have at least one child of each sex. 
The most surprising result is perhaps that the patterns differ so much between women and 
men. Women might need children more because they are more often widowed, however an 
analysis stratified by marital status did not give support to this interpretation.  
One might expect the relationship between children’s sex composition and parents’ mortality 
to vary with age and education, but no such pattern appeared. Only a significant conditioning 
effect of age at first birth was seen: among women who entered motherhood early, those with 
only sons had a particularly high mortality (odds ratio 1.10; 95% confidence interval 1.021-
1.177). The main reason might be that it is more stressful for young girls to raise boys as they 
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are often more energetic and boisterous and are a greater drain on the mother, especially if she 
lacks the support of a partner, as many teenage mothers do. 
 
Limitations 
One limitation of the study is the somewhat limited age range of parents (40-73) that could be 
included. It may be that some characteristics typically associated with a child’s sex are 
appreciated by parents primarily at higher ages. An example may be willingness, especially of 
daughters, to offer social support. The relatively narrow age range also means that the 
distribution of deaths by cause in the sample differs from the distribution for the population as 
a whole. It may be that children’s sex is more important for causes of death that are more 
prevalent at higher ages5. Furthermore, given the data it is not possible to determine the 
possible mechanisms through which children’s sex composition may affect mortality. 
Another major limitation of this study is that factors such as previous health status, earlier life 
crises and socio-economic status other than education could not be controlled for. It is 
however possible that such factors affect both the children’s sex and the parents’ mortality. 
For instance the male-female sex ratio at birth might not be constant even in settings where 
sex-specific abortion is very uncommon. It has been found to diminish subsequent to disasters 
or economic downturns (e.g. [58,59,60]). Furthermore, stressful life events such as having a 
severely ill partner or child, or bereavement, are associated with a lower sex ratio [61].  
Conversely, characteristics indicative of an advantaged situation, economically or otherwise, 
are associated with high sex ratios:  married mothers have been found to give birth to more 
                                                          
5 Research looking at the association between children’s sex and specific causes of death would be an interesting 
topic for further research. This dataset is also well suited to address other topics such as studying the mortality of 
those who have lost a child. 
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boys than mothers not living with the father [62,63], and better educated mothers have more 
sons [64], as do male billionaires - 60% compared to 51% in the population as a whole [65]. 
Being married, more highly educated or rich also reduces mortality, while adverse life 
experiences, such as unemployment or losing a child, has been linked to higher mortality later 
in life [66]. These factors may therefore in principle give rise to an inverse spurious 
relationship between the proportion of the children who are sons and parents’ mortality.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This article finds that there is a small mortality disadvantage among women with two children 
having only daughters, among women who had their first child as a teenager and only have 
sons, and among mothers in the 1980s who only have children of one sex. Mothers of two 
daughters and no sons have a higher mortality than mothers of two sons and no daughter. 
However, mothers of four daughters and no sons have a lower mortality than mothers of four 
sons and no daughters. The results lend some support to the notion that there is a larger 
benefit of the first son or daughter than later children of the same sex. This is more 
pronounced in the earliest decade of the study period, when men and women had more 
different roles. The findings also indicate (weakly) that supposed benefits of having a 
daughter (for example because of their special contributions as caregivers), may be somewhat 
smaller than the positive effects of having a son, such as stronger involvement by the father, 
which probably also benefits the mother. However, having many sons may be a burden on the 
mother. In principle, the observed relationships may also reflect selection processes.  
Obviously, one cannot conclude from such estimates that men and women who have only 
girls or boys should try to have an additional child of the opposite sex to improve their health 
in the long term. Neither do mortality differentials of this modest size serve as a warning that 
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groups of parents with a special sex composition deserve extra attention. Rather, the results 
should be seen as interesting illustrations of how far-reaching consequences the sex 
composition of one’s children might have on one’s life.   
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